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ABSTRACT 
This study analyses the changing state of relationship between Turkey and 
Bulgaria after the end of the Cold War era and subsequent democratization and 
liberalization attempts in Bulgaria. It points out that although the bilateral 
relationship remained tense throughout much of the Cold War and the Bulgarian 
assimilation campaign of 1980s against its Turkish minority led to a crisis between 
Sofia and Ankara, with the overthrow of the Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov in late 
1989, relations began to improve. Currently, the two countries cooperate in many 
areas, from security to economics. The thesis argues that the rapprochement between 
Sofia and Ankara in recent years defies the argument of ancient ethnic hatreds 
attributed to the Balkans. The study also claims that Sofia's rapprochement with 
Ankara should be evaluated in terms of its Europeanization attempts. The future state 
of relationship between Turkey and Bulgaria is dependent upon their relationship 
with the European institutions. 
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OZET 
Bu yah~ma, Soguk Sava~'m sona ermesinin ve Bulganstan'da 
demokratikle~me ve liberalle~me yolunda reformlara ba~lanmasmm ardmdan, Tiirkiye 
ile Bulgaristan arasmdaki ili~kilerde meydana gelen degi~imi incelemektedir. Soguk 
Sava~'m onemli bir boliimii boyunca iki ii.Ike arasmdaki ili~kilerin gergin olmasma ve 
Bulgaristan'm Turk azmhga kar~1 1980'li y1llarda uygulad1g1 asimilasyon 
politikas1yla ortaya ¥tkan krize ragmen, Bulgar lider Todor Jivkov'un 1989' da 
gorevden almmas1yla Sofya-Ankara ili~kileri iyile~meye ba~lam1~tlr. Halihazirda iki 
iilke arasmda aralarmda gilvenlik, ekonominin de oldugu pek ¥Ok alanda i~birligi 
yapilmaktadir. Bu yah~mada, Sofya ile Ankara arasmda son y1llarda meydana gelen 
yakmla~manm, Balkanlar i¥in ileri siiriilen tarihi etnik yat1~malar hipotezini yilrilttilgil 
gosterilmektedir.Bu tez, aynca, Sofya'mn Ankara'yla yakmla~masmm, Bulgaristan'm 
Avrupa'yla i~birligini geli~tirme yabalar1 yeryevesinde degerlendirilmesi gerektigini 
ve iki iilkenin gelecekteki ili~kilerinin bu iilkelerin Avrupa kurumlar1yla olan 
ili~kilerine bagh oldugunu savunmaktadir. 
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The Turks and Bulgarians have common history of approximately 500 years 
under the Ottoman Empire. After the Bulgarian declaration of independence in 1908, 
the relations between the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria became very tense. They 
fought against each other in the two Balkan Wars. But then they became allies in the 
First World War. Historical research suggests that Bulgaria gave substantial support 
to the Turkish War of Independence. However, because of Bulgarian revisionist 
policies, the relations were far from being perfect after the foundation of Turkish 
Republic, particularly in the late 1920s and much of 1930s. 
The two countries were parts of opposing blocs during the Cold War era. 
While Turkey chose to be a member of Western bloc, Bulgaria became the closest 
ally of the Soviet Union. During this period they could not pursue independent 
foreign policies other than prescribed by their alliances. That was why the relations 
between Turkey and Bulgaria were dependent upon two factors: 1) the state of 
relations between the two power blocs, 2) Turkish-Soviet and Bulgarian-Soviet 
relations. 
The relations between the two countries, that never became cordial during 
this era, experienced its biggest crisis in the late 1980s when the Bulgarian 
government put into execution a forced Bulgarization campaign against the Turkish 
minority and even deported more than 350,000 Turks in 1989. It was criticized 
harshly not just by Turkey, but also by much of the international community. 
When the communist regime of Bulgaria was toppled in late 1989, the 
country entered a new period in terms of both domestic and foreign policy. The 
rights of Turkish minority were restored and mosques opened. Although between 
1990 and February 1997 it was mostly governed by Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP}, 
Bulgaria pursued different policies from its communist predecessors. In this new era 
it tried to be a member of the Western bloc. To reach this aim it tried to repair its 
relations with Turkey. Thanks to the end of the Cold War, the two countries would 
now pursue independent policies. Ever since Turco-Bulgarian relations have been on 
the way to betterment. Mutual visits have been taking place very often. Bulgarian 
leaders have even apologized publicly on several occasions for what was done to the 
Turkish minority of Bulgaria during Todor Zhivkov government. 
This thesis aims to describe the changing state of Turkish-Bulgarian relations 
in the post-Cold War era. After the crisis years of 1980s, Bulgaria has now become 
one of the two neighbors out of seven that Turkey has a close relationship. She has 
become one of the most cooperative partners for Turkey in the Balkan affairs. 
Bulgaria seeks Turkish support for its admission to NATO. 
The thesis argues that the substantial change in Turkish-Bulgarian relations 
prove the falsity of the ethnic-hatred theory attributed to the Balkans. When there is 
an appropriate state of international affairs and they have rational and good-
intentioned leaders, Balkan countries can also have friendly relations. This study tries 
to foresee the future course of bilateral contacts as well. 
The thesis consists of six chapters. The second chapter gives a summary of 
bilateral relations beginning from declaration of independence by Bulgaria from the 
Ottoman Empire until 1980. The third chapter is focused on the crisis period, caused 
by Zhivkov's campaign of forced assimilation against Turkish minority in Bulgaria. 
2 
The fourth chapter presents an analysis of impact of post-Cold War developments on 
contacts between Sofia and Ankara. It draws attention to the speedy recovery of 
crisis period and formation of close alliances. The fifth chapter examines the case of 
bilateral relations after the Union of Democratic Forces had come to power in 
Bulgaria. The sixth chapter, namely conclusion, contains a perspective for 
prospective relations. 
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CHAPTER II 
BULGARIAN DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND TURCO-
BULGARIAN RELATIONS UNTIL 1980 
2.1. Declaration of Independence by Bulgaria 
Bulgaria declared its independence through a unilateral declaration in 1908 and 
its leader Ferdinand got the title of tsar by using the opportunity of turbulence caused 
by the Young Turk Revolution in the Ottoman Empire. 1 The issue of Bulgarian 
independence was the first foreign policy problem that the new Ottoman regime 
confronted. 2 Though the Ottoman Empire did not want to accept this declaration of 
independence, it was not able to launch a war against Bulgaria. 3 In 1909 the Ottoman 
government came to recognize the Bulgarian independence. 4 
2.2. Balkan Wars 
The weakening of the Ottoman Empire and the irredentist aims of Bulgaria 
wishing to regain the lands given to her by San Stefano Treaty of 1878 led them to 
fight two Balkan Wars on the opposite sides. 
In the First Balkan War, Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro fought 
against the Ottoman Empire. The war resulted in the defeat of the Ottomans. 
According to the Treaty of London of 1913 Ottoman possessions in Europe were 
limited to Istanbul and its surrounding territory. Bulgaria got Adrianople; Crete was 
1 Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans: 2d,, Century, Vol. 2, Cambridge University Press, 1985, 
r· 40. 
Hasan Onal, "Ottoman Policy During the Bulgarian Independence Crisis, 1908-1909: Ottoman 
Empire and Bulgaria at the Outset of the Young Turk Revolution", Middle Eastern Studies, October 
1998, Vol. 34, No.4, p. 139. 
3 Ibid., p. 148. 
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given to Greece. But the important problem of the division of the disputed lands of 
Ottoman Macedonia could not be solved among the Balkan allies. 5 
The gains of the First Balkan War did not satisfy the Balkan powers. Greece and 
Serbia made a secret agreement to divide Ottoman Macedonia. However, Bulgaria 
was passionately seeking to regain Macedonia that was given to her by the San 
Stefano Treaty of 1878, but taken back by the Berlin Congress. 
Believing that it would get a big victory, Bulgaria attacked Greece and Serbia. 
Romania, Montenegro, and the Ottoman Empire joined the war against the irredentist 
Bulgaria. The result was a complete defeat for Sofia. It even lost what she had won 
in the First Balkan War. While the other countries gained large chunks of conquered 
Ottoman territories, Bulgaria lost Adrianople to the Ottomans and southern Dobrudja 
to Romania as a result of the Treaty of Bucharest signed in 1913. Greece and Serbia 
divided most of the Macedonian lands. Bulgaria got only the small Pirin Macedonia 
and a part of Thrace that included the Aegean port ofDedeagach. 6 
The Treaty of Bulgaria of 1913 signed between Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria 
was the first peace treaty between these two countries. It established the common 
border and regulated the rights of Turkish minority. 7 
2.3. The First World War 
Although the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria had fought against each other in the 
two Balkan Wars, they did become allies by joining the Central Powers in the First 
World War. Both countries were hoping to regain what they had lost in the preceding 
4 Ibid., p. 166. 
5 Jelavich, op. cit., p. 99. 
6 Jelavich, op. cit., p.166 and Richard Crampton, A Short History of Modern Bulgaria, Cambridge 
University Press, 1987, p. 62. 
7 Oral Sander, "Turkish-Bulgarian Relations'', Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy Institute, 1986, Vol. 12, 
No. 3-4, p. 11. 
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wars. According to the Bulgarian Prime Minister Radoslavov Bulgarian war aims 
were "to unite the Bulgarian nation within its historic and ethnographic borders". By 
this statement he implied the annexation of Ottoman Macedonia, Dobrudja, some 
parts of Thrace, and the Morava Valley. 8 
Bulgaria joined the First World War on the side of the Central Powers in 1915. 
In return for Bulgaria's entry to the war on its side, Germany did offer to Sofia all of 
Macedonia and much of Thrace. Germany even persuaded the Ottoman Empire to let 
Bulgaria have control of the railway line to Dedeagach.9 
During the War, Ottomans and Bulgarians fought together at some fronts and 
their relations returned to normal. 1° Furthermore, this period witnessed the formation 
of new Bulgaria-Turkish cultural associations in Bulgaria. There was a trend to stress 
the ethnic solidarity of Bulgarians and Turks. 11 
The war resulted in the defeat of the Central Powers and the dissolution of the 
Ottoman Empire which was occupied by the victorious Entente Powers. On the other 
hand, Bulgaria signed the humiliating treaty of Neuilly in 1919, according to which, 
it had to give four border districts to Yugoslavia and Western Thrace to Greece. 
Bulgaria was in ruins in financial, social, and military terms by fighting three wars in 
• 12 
six years. 
2.4. Relations During the Turkish War of Independence 
According to historical research, Bulgaria supported the Turkish forces in the 
Turkish War of Independence. Along with the Turks living in Adrianople, some 
8 Richard J. Crampton, Bulgaria, 1878-1918 A History, East European Monographs, Boulder, 
distributed by Columbia University Press, New York, 1983, p. 451. 
9 Richard J. Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 141. 
10 Aptulahat Ak$in, Atatark'un Dz§ Politika ilkeleri ve Diplomasisi, Tfirk Tarih Kurumu Yaymlari, 16. 
Dizi, No. 56, Turk Tarih Kurumu Bas1rnevi, Ankara, 1991. 
11 Crampton, Bulgaria, 1878-1918, op.cit., p. 452. 
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Bulgarians in Bulgaria living close to the Turkish side formed 30 armed gangs 
together. In 1920 the Turkish soldiers who lost the war in Thrace went over to the 
Bulgarian side to fight against Greece. It was reported that 385 officers, 2239 
soldiers, and also 22,000 civilians fled to Bulgaria. 13 
The Bulgarian government recognized Mustafa Kemal' s representatives m 
Bulgaria. Prime Minister Stamboliiski said: "Kemal Pasha has some representatives 
in Bulgaria. Can we expel people who has come here, but did nothing harmful?"14 
The Agrarian government of Bulgaria under the leadership of Stamboliiski 
supported the Turkish side in its war against Greece. They did not allow the Allied 
Powers to use Bulgaria as a base to attack Turkey. Even before the declaration of the 
Turkish Republic, they allowed Mustafa Kemal to open a representative office in 
Bulgaria. One of Mustafa Kemal's close friends Cevad Abbas (Giirer) organized the 
Bulgarian support. However, under immense pressure of the Allies, after a while 
Bulgaria had to send Cevat Abbas back to Turkey. 15 At the time, it was also claimed 
that Bulgarian government was providing Kemalist forces with weapons. 16 
The Agrarian government in Bulgaria sent a secret delegation to Ankara in May 
1921, which visited some fronts together with ismet Pa~a, like Ankara, Eski~ehir, 
inebolu, Kastamonu, Kiitahya, Antalya, Sivas. When the Western media published 
reports on this visit, Bulgarian government was criticized severely. 17 
The aim of the Bulgarian support was the belief that if Turkish War of 
Independence came to a successful end for Turkey, the Treaty of Neuilly that 
Bulgaria had had to sign at the end of the First World War might be questioned along 
12 Jelavich, op. cit., p. 166. 
13 Pars Tuglac1, Bulgaristan ve Turk-Bu/gar jfi§kileri, Cern Yaymevi, istanbul, 1984, p.120 and Stefan 
Velikov, Kemalist jhtilal ve Bulgaristan (1918-1922), Ceviren: Nairne Y1lrnaer, Hiisniitabiat 
Matbaas1, istanbul, Nisan 1969. 
14 Ibid., p. 121. 
15 Velikov, op. cit., p. 108. 
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with the Sevres Treaty. Bulgarian Prime Minister expressed this conviction clearly: 
"Together with the revision of Sevres Treaty all other treaties would also be subject 
to change." 18 To this end, Bulgarian government was, apparently even, sending 
retired soldiers and officers to Anatolia to fight with the Turks. 19 
2.5. The Foundation of the Republic of Turkey and Balkan Entente 
The new Turkish Republic was founded on October 29, 1923. The most 
important foreign policy goal of Turkey was the maintenance of its independence 
and of the status quo determined by the Lausanne Treaty.20 Turkey wanted to have 
friendly relations with all its neighbors. 
By 1923 two groups of countries emerged in the Balkans: Greece, Romania, and 
Yugoslavia (Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes) as well as Turkey that did not 
have any territorial claims. Of these, Bulgaria was the only primary revisionist 
country in the Balkans which opted for retaking the territories it had lost in the 
previous wars. 21 
Turkey and Bulgaria signed the Ankara Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 
1925. From Turkey's point of view, the signing of this Treaty did not have special 
implications: In fact, Turkey signed similar treaties with most of the Balkan states.22 
The one signed with Bulgaria provided certain guarantees for the Turkish minority in 
Bulgaria and Bulgarian minority in Turkey. It included the right of voluntary 
16 Tuglac1, Bulgaristan ve Turk-Bu/gar jJi§kileri, pp. 124-125. 
17 Velikov, op. cit., pp. 98-105. 
18 Tuglac1, Bulgaristan ve Turk-Bu/gar jJi§kileri, p. 126. 
19 Velikov, op. cit., p. 117. 
20 Olay/aria Tark Dz§ Politikasz, (1919-1973), 3. basla, Sevini; Matbaas1, Ankara, 1974, p. 106. 
21 Mustafa Tiirke~, "The Balkan Pact and Its Immediate Implications for the Balkan States, 1930-
1934", Middle Eastern Studies, January 1994, Vol. 30, No. 1., p. 124 and Sina Ak~t & Melek Fuat, 
jk; Sava§ Arasz Donemde Balkanlar, Ortadogu ve Balkan incelemeleri Vakfi Yaymlan, Eren, istanbul, 
1993, p. 113. 
22 Olay/aria Tark Dz§ Politikasz, op. cit., p. 107. 
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migration for both minority groups.23 Furthermore, the Treaty of Neutrality, 
Conciliation, and Arbitration was signed in 1929 between the two countries. 24 
Turkey's main aim was to protect her borders against the revisionist states, namely 
Bulgaria in the Balkans and Italy in Europe. Italy was aiming at penetrating into the 
Balkans. On the other hand, the anti-revisionist Balkan states were concerned about 
the possibility ofltalian-Bulgarian cooperation in this regard.25 
From the late 1920s onwards, with Venizelos coming to the power in Greece, 
there was a considerable rapprochement between Turkey and Greece. With the 
conclusion of Entente Cordiale on September 14, 1933, the two countries undertook 
to safeguard their common frontier in Thrace, agreed to ask the opinion of the other 
party on international questions and stated their readiness to rely on the limited 
representation of the other party in international meetings. 26 The Entente Cordiale 
increased the suspicions of Bulgaria towards both Turkey and Greece. In fact, 
according to the reports, Turkish side had wanted to include Bulgaria as well in the 
conclusion of this agreement. The then Prime Minister ismet inonii and Foreign 
Minister Tevfik Rii~tii Aras had, indeed, proposed it to the Bulgarian side during 
their visit to Sofia27, but Bulgaria rejected the offer, since it would have meant the 
acceptance of anti-revisionism, namely giving up her claims over Thrace, something 
Bulgaria was not ready to accept. 28 
The first Balkan Conference was held in Athens with the participation of both 
Turkey and Bulgaria among other countries on October 6-11, 1930. It accepted a 
resolution, proposing that the participants examine the idea of a Balkan Pact to 
23 Sander, op. cit., p. 
24 Burak Reis Sat, 'Tiirk-Bulgar ili~leri', Strateji, 1996, No. 2., p. 12. 
25 Tiirke~, op. cit., p. 128. 
26 Ibid., pp. 129-130. 
27 Olaylarla Tiirk D1~ Politikas1, (1919-1973), op. cit., p.109. 
28 Tiirke~, op. cit., p. 131. 
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achieve conciliatory relationships between the Balkan countries. 29 The second and 
third Balkan Conferences were rather academic meetings and could not attain any 
concrete result. At the fourth Balkan Conference held in Salonica on November 5-11, 
1933, the draft of the Balkan Entente was adopted.30 Accordingly, in February 1934 
the Balkan Entente was formed between Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Romania. 
Thereby the contracting countries guaranteed the security of each other's borders. If 
any threat against their territorial integrity were to arise, they would consult each 
other.31 The Treaty stated that other Balkan countries could join in, implying 
primarily Bulgaria. 32 
There were two primary reasons for the conclusion of the Balkan Entente: Its 
basic aim was to unite anti-revisionist Balkan states in the face of the threat posed by 
revisionist states, namely Bulgaria and Italy. Besides Bulgaria's claims over 
Macedonia, Thrace and Dobrudja, Italy had some aspirations over the 
Mediterranean. 33 Second reason was the fear of Yugoslav-Bulgarian rapprochement. 
The signatories were also trying to prevent the formation of a possible Bulgarian-
Yugoslav cooperation that would have the capacity to tum into a powerful Slav bloc 
later.34 
In the end, the Balkan Entente did not last long. The Friendship Treaty of 1937 
signed between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia did weaken the Balkan Entente to a great 
extent. The Entente held its last meeting in 1940. There were two basic reasons for 
its failure: 1) Since Bulgaria could not be convinced to join the Entente, her 
revisionist policies still constituted an important problem regarding Balkan countries. 
29 Ibid., p. 132. 
30 Ibid., p. 133. 
31 Sander, op. cit., p. 12 and Nii.zhet Kandemir, 'Balkan Cooperation', Turkish Review Quarterly 
Digest, Winter 1987, Vol. 2, No. 10, p. 6. 
32 Branimir M. Jankovic, The Balkans in International Relations, Macmillan Press, 1988, p. 155. 
33 Olay/aria Tark Dz§ Politikasz, p. 111. 
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2) It did not provide any security guarantee in case of an attack by a non-Balkan 
state.35 
After the beginning of the Second World War, Turkey and Bulgaria signed the 
Common Declaration in 1940, stating their good will to maintain security in the 
Balkans and guaranteeing to respect mutually each other's neutrality. They 
undertook to withdraw military troops from the border.36 At the beginning of the War 
in September 1939, Bulgaria declared its neutrality. During the 1930s Bulgaria and 
Germany had close political and economic relations. Bulgaria was approached by 
both the USSR and Germany, each promising territorial gains in case of Bulgarian 
cooperation.37 In compliance with a Turkish offer, Turkish and Bulgarian 
delegations began to negotiate in November 1940, as a result of which a Declaration 
was signed proposing non-aggression toward each other. 38 
The military successes of Germany at the beginning of the War increased its 
attraction for Bulgaria as a possible ally and finally Bulgaria joined the Axis 
powers.39 But Bulgarian Ambassador to Turkey tried to make it clear that this 
alliance with Germany was not necessarily incompatible with the Turkish-Bulgarian 
Non-Aggression Pact. 40 When Bulgaria occupied Greece with the help of German 
troops, both Bulgarian and German forces carried out a policy of massacre against 
the Greeks in Thrace. Thanks to her alliance with Germany, Bulgaria occupied 
southern Dobrudja, Thrace, and Macedonia as well, on condition that full ownership 
of these areas would be given to Bulgaria at the end of the war.41 
34 Oral Sander, Balkan Geli§meleri ve Turkiye: 1945-1965, Sevin~ Matbaas1, Ankara, 1969, pp. 10-11. 
35 Tiirke~, op. cit., p. 141. 
36 Sat, op. cit., p. 148. 
37 Crampton, A Short History of Bulgaria, op. cit., pp. 121-122 and sat, op. cit., p. 150. 
38 Sat, op. cit., p. 150 and Olay/aria Turk Dl§ Politikas1, p. 164. 
39 Crampton, A Short History of Bulgaria, op. cit., p. 24. 
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2.6. Bulgaria Under the Communist Rule 
The surprising German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941 created certain 
amount of uneasiness in Bulgaria. In September 1944, the Soviet Union declared war 
on Bulgaria and her troops entered the country. There was no resistance to the Soviet 
occupation. 42 Soviet occupation did not bring about communist government m 
Bulgaria immediately. The first government after the war was comprised of 
communists, agrarians, social democrats and three members of Zveno movement.43 
The Red Army was going to remain in the country until the end of 1947.44 
The Churchill-Stalin percentage agreement of October 1944 had given the 
Soviet Union 75 percent influence in Bulgaria, but in fact the Soviet Union became 
the only master of the country. In September 1946 a referendum was carried out in 
Bulgaria, in which 95 percent of the voters supported the formation of the republic. 
The royal family had to leave Bulgaria. A constitution declaring Bulgaria 'People's 
Republic' was accepted in the Grand Parliament the following year. 45 At the Paris 
Peace Treaty of 1947 the boundaries of Bulgaria were fixed the same as the pre-war 
borders, with the only exception that this time Bulgaria preserved southern 
Dobrudja.46 
During the Cold War years Turkey and Bulgaria were members of the opposing 
alliances. While Bulgaria did become the most loyal ally of the Soviet communist 
regime, Turkey did join the security organ of the Western world, NATO in 1952. 
From then on their relations were shadowed by the bipolar structure of the world 
40 Sat, op. cit., p.151. 
41 Crampton, A Short History of Bulgaria, op. cit., pp. 124-125. 
42 Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans: 2d" Century, op. cit., p. 261. 
43 It consisted of a group of intellectuals who were hostile to party politics: See Andrei Pantev, 'The 
Historic Road of the Third Bulgarian state' in Iliana Zloch-Christy, Bulgaria in a Time of Change, p. 
16. 
44 Crampton, A Short History of Bulgaria, op. cit., pp. 145-146. 
45 Pantev, op. cit., p. 18. 
46 Crampton, A Short History of Bulgaria, op. cit., p. 160. 
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politics. Their bilateral contacts were dependent upon the state of relations between 
the then two superpowers, namely the US and the Soviet Union, as well as Turkey's 
relations with the Soviet Union. The membership to the security organizations of the 
power blocs restricted their ability to carry out independent policy from that of the 
allies to a great extent. All this did not, however, mean continuous tension. For 
instance, there were short periods of cooperation, though every time, each side 
looked to the other with apprehension. 
With the ratification of the Bulgarian new constitution m 194 7, Bulgaria 
became a people's republic. Being almost the satellite of the USSR it became the 
founding member of the Comecon in 1949 and of Warsaw Pact in 1955.47 The Cold 
War period and the new regime in Bulgaria put an end to the short period of 
cooperation between the two countries from 1945 and 1947. The year 1948 
witnessed Bulgarian terrorist attempts against the Turkish targets. Two Turkish 
airplanes were shot down during their flight within Bulgarian airspace. An attack was 
carried out against the Turkish Consulate in Plovdiv as well. 48 Relations remained 
bad, or, at best, indifferent until the mid- l 960s. On 13 March 1948 the Bulgarian 
side decided to expel the Turkish military attache in Bulgaria, claiming that he was 
involved in espionage facilities. As a result, Ankara closed the Embassy and 
retaliated by expelling Bulgarian military attache in Turkey. This time, relations 
reached a crisis point. 49 
After the Second World War, thanks to the encouragement of the USSR, 
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia reached a compromise. From 1946 onwards they signed a 
series of agreements that signalled the very possibility of the formation of a 
471bid., pp. 160-166. 
48 Tuglac1, op. cit., p. 133. 
49 Valeri Stojanov, 'Ausgrenzung und Integration: Die bulgarischen Tiirken nach dem Zweiten 
Weltkrieg (1944/45-1989), Osterreichische Osthefte, Jahrgang 39, 1997, Heft 2., pp. 197-198. 
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federation between these two countries. On 2 August 194 7 their leaders signed the 
Bled Agreement, according to which some bureaucratic regulations, including visa 
requirement were to be lifted and work was to be done to realize customs union and 
cooperation would be improved in the economic field. This agreement prepared the 
ground for a possible federation. Afterwards Albania and Romania signed the 
agreement as well. But this alliance suffered from the expulsion of Yugoslavia from 
the Comintem because of the Tito-Stalin break. 50 Until that, the improving relations 
between the communist Balkan countries worried Turkey and led Ankara to tighten 
her relations with the Western world. 51 
1950 and 1951 became the scene of great confrontation between the two 
countries. In 1950 Bulgarian government gave a diplomatic note stating that 250,000 
people would be sent to Turkey within three months. The flow of refugees lasted for 
two months and 150,000-155,000 Bulgarian Turks emigrated to Turkey. Then 
Turkey had to close the border, but two months later opened it again for those who 
had Turkish visas. 52 What was behind the Bulgarian policy to expel the Turks was 
complicated. But speculation may be made: first of all, Western-oriented policies of 
the Adnan Menderes government did not please the Soviet Union which wished to 
punish Turkey by expelling bag and baggage thousands of Turks from Bulgaria. It 
was revealed in a book entitled: 'Eastern Europe in the Russian Archives', comprised 
of 337 top secret documents and minutes, published by the Slavic Institute of Science 
and Research. According to these documents, the expulsion was carried out with the 
order of the then Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. The Documents claimed that Bulgaria 
was troubled with the increasing identity of the Turkish population, and Stalin simply 
50 Sander, Balkan Geli§me/eri ve Tarkiye: 1945-1965, op. cit., pp. 35-37. 
51 Ibid., pp. 41-42. 
52 Tuglac1, op. cit., pp. 133-134. 
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ordered the expulsion. 53 The other reason was the increasing unemployment rate in 
Bulgaria as a result of collectivization and industrialization which subsequently 
decreased need for manual labor. 54 
When Stalin died in 1953, there were the signs of a detente with the beginning 
of his successor Khruschchev' s de-Stalinization campaign. This also decreased the 
mutual suspicion that Turkey and Bulgaria felt toward each other but not to the 
extent of friendly relations. In 1956 Bulgaria offered Turkey to discuss the question 
of emigration of Turks within the context of closer cooperation, but Turkey refused 
to take it into consideration. Ankara still could not trust Bulgaria. 55 Nevertheless, 
between mid 1950s and mid 1960s a period of normalization took place in the 
relations. There were even preparations for signing agreements on border disputes 
and bilateral trade. However, all this did not lead to a radical change in the relations. 
1950-1951 expulsion by Bulgaria of Turks led to suspicion on the part of 
Turkey, that considered the exodus as a Soviet game through Bulgaria to exert 
pressure on Turkey. At the time, it was not only Turkey that was suspicious of 
Bulgaria's policies. After Tito-Stalin break in 1948 and Belgrad's expulsion from the 
Cominform, there were rumors that Bulgaria, Romania and Macedonia56 would wage 
a war against Yugoslavia. In addition, Yugoslavia had problems with Bulgaria and 
Albania. 57 These common doubts regarding Bulgaria and some other security 
concerns led to the conclusion of the Balkan Pact on 28 February 1953 between 
Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia. According to that, these three countries would 
consult each other on questions of common concern, security questions would be 
53 Hurriyet, 10 Mart 1999. 
54 Sander, Balkan Geli~meleri ve Tarkiye: 1945-1965, op. cit., pp. 70-72. 
55 Wolfgang Hopken, 'Bulgarian-Turkish Relations', in Turkey and the Balkans: Economic and 
Political Dimensions, The Middle East Business and Banking Magazine Publications, edited by Erol 
Manisah, Giiray Matbaas1, 1990, p. 78. 
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analysed together and three chiefs of staff would continue to cooperate. Moreover, 
there was the unwritten aim of parties to get more military and economic aid from 
the US in this way as part of the famous 'containment policy'. In August 1954 it was 
turned into an alliance by the signature of the Bled Agreement. With this agreement 
the contracting parties undertook to help militarily if one of them was attacked. This 
was an important difference from the Balkan Entente in 1934 that did not presuppose 
military cooperation of this nature. 
Beginning from the second half of the 1950s, there were a few developments in 
the Balkan peninsula that made the Bled Agreement ineffectual. First, there was 
rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Second, there emerged 
Cyprus problem between Turkey and Greece. 
As a result of easing of relations between East and West, a period of honeymoon 
emerged between Turkey and Bulgaria in late 1960s and first half of the 1970s. The 
problems that came about between Turkey and the US emerging after the American 
withdrawal of missiles from Turkey following the Cuban Crisis of 1962 and 
American policy toward the Cyprus problem in the mid 1960s contributed to this 
honeymoon period. After the US began to impose an arms embargo on Turkey 
following Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974 this process of warming relations 
became even more visible. For instance, in 1966 full diplomatic relations had been 
reestablished. From 1968 onwards, there were visits at the level of foreign ministers 
and heads of states. Several agreements were concluded regarding cooperation in 
economic field and trade. 
In 1968 the emigration and family unification agreement was signed causing the 
emigration of 130,000 Turks between 1968 and 1978. In the late 1960s the 
56 At the time Macedonia was one of the six constituting republics of the Federal People's Republic of 
Yugoslavia that was proclaimed in 1945. 
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restrictions on the rights of Turkish minority were reduced by Bulgaria. 
Economically, the two countries became more dependent on each other. Bulgaria had 
been the gateway especially for Turkish workers of the West Germany. Moreover, 
Turkey needed Bulgarian electrical energy supplies. Bulgaria had to use Turkish 
Straits for its sea trade. Bulgarian trucks had to go through Turkey to reach Arab and 
Iranian markets. 58 In 1975 Declaration of Good Neighbourly Relations was signed 
between Turkey and Bulgaria. Both countries agreed on issues like preservation of 
peace and detente. Its significance lies in the fact that it was signed only one year 
after the Cyprus intervention by Turkey. 
2.7. Situation of the Turkish Minority Between 1908-1980 
From its declaration of independence until the first half of the 1980s, Bulgaria's 
policy towards her Turkish minority was full of fluctuations. Until the 1940s Turkish 
schools had had some autonomy. After the First World War even funds were 
allocated and land was given to Turkish schools. 
However, the years of 1934-1944 became one of the darkest periods for the 
education of the Turks in Bulgaria. Hundreds of Turkish schools were closed down, 
as a result, 75 percent of the Turkish children of school age could not attend the 
school. In 1946 all Turkish minority schools were nationalized, which, until that 
time, had had the status of private schools. Nevertheless, the first years of the 
communist regime were very tolerant in regard to the rights of Turkish minority. 
Turkish schoolbooks were allowed to publish and Turkish teachers became civil 
servants in this period. 
57 Sander, Balkan Geli~meleri ve Tarkiye (1945-1965), pp. 84-86. 
58 Tuglac1, op. cit., p. 135. 
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But with the unification of the Turkish schools with the Bulgarian ones in 1959-
1960 by Todor Zhivkov, education in Turkish was brought to an end in most places. 
Most of Turkish children were made exempt from their right to study in their mother 
tongue. 59 In areas where the population was entirely Turkish, Turkish language was 
kept, but the hours of Bulgarian classes were increased. But where there was mixed 
population and Turks were in majority, all lessons were thought in Bulgarian. 60 
During the communist period Bulgaria tried to create a one-nation state at the 
expense of especially the Turkish minority. It tried to suppress Turkish identity. 
59 Tuglac1, op. cit., p.189. 
60 Pars Tuglaci, 'The Fate of the Turkish Minority in the People's Republic of Bulgaria', Foreign 
Policy, 1986, Vol 12, No. 3-4, pp. 59-60. 
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CHAPTER III 
DETERIORATION OF BILATERAL RELATIONS AND THE CRISIS IN 
1980s 
3.1. Rights of Turkish Minority in Bulgaria According to International Law 
According to the agreements signed between Turkey and Bulgaria, the Turks 
living in Bulgaria have the national minority status. With the Berlin Treaty of 1878 
Bulgaria undertook to protect the rights and interests of the Turks. In addition, Sofia 
guaranteed that the Bulgarian law would not adopt provisions that would be contrary 
to this treaty. 
Moreover, in the Peace Treaty of September 1913, signed at the end of the 
Balkan Wars, the minority rights of Bulgarian Turks were once more recognized. 1 
Moreover, the existence of its schools, foundations, language, and muftis were 
safeguarded. Bulgaria recognized the private status of the Turkish schools and 
undertook to open and finance new schools where the teaching medium would be 
Turkish.2 On the other hand, the Neuilly Treaty of 1919 admitted full equality of all 
minorities. It recognized the right of the Turkish minority to open new schools and 
use Turkish without any restriction.3 Ankara Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation 
1 Bilal $im~ir, 'The Legal Status of the Turkish Minority in Bulgaria Under Bilateral and Multilateral 
Treaties', Foreign Policy, 1986, Vol. 12, no. 3-4, pp. 102-107. For a detailed information on the legal 
rights of Turkish minority recognized by Bulgaria, please see also, A. Mete Tuncoku, 'The Rights of 
Minorities in International Law and Treaties: The Case of Turkish Minority in the People's Republic 
of Bulgaria', in The Turks of Bulgaria: The History, Culture and Political Fate of a Minority, edited 
by Kernal Karpat, ISIS Press, istanbul, 1990, pp. 241 - 244. 
2 Bilal $im~ir, 'The Fate of the Turkish Minority in the People's Republic of Bulgaria', Foreign 
Policy, 1986, Vol. 12, no. 3-4, pp. 38-39. 
3 Ibid., p. 3 9 
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signed in 1925 provided Turkish minority in Bulgaria and Bulgarian minority in 
Turkey with specific guarantees. 4 
Another important agreement that recognized the existence of Turkish 
minority in Bulgaria was the Migration Agreement of 1968 signed between Turkey 
and Bulgaria, aiming to unite the families which had been expelled to Turkey in 
1950-1951. The agreement in Article 1 referred to the Bulgarian citizens of Turkish 
descent.5 
3.2. The Campaign of Bulgarization Against Minorities 
Most of the Turkish population of the Balkans live in Bulgaria. Before the 
exodus of 1989 the number of Turks were estimated at between 900,000 and 
1,500,000 out of a population of around 8,900,000. 6 As mentioned in the preceding 
chapter, beginning from the late 1950s Bulgaria restricted Turkish minorities' right 
to education in their native language. It tried to create a 'socialist one-nation state'. 
Although in rhetoric Bulgarian leaders recognized the existence of Turkish minority, 
the assimilation campaign was conducted gradually that reached its peak in the 
1980s, when the internal politics and world order were deemed by Zhivkov 
appropriate for such a campaign. 
Zhivkov came to power in 1956. His tenure was marked by restrictions of 
minority rights and greater dependence on the Soviet Union. While on the one hand, 
he reduced the hours of Turkish classes, on the other, he launched a campaign to 
change the Muslim names of Pomaks and Moslem Gypsies. It was claimed by 
4 Sander, 'Turkish - Bulgarian Relations', op. cit., p. 12. 
5 Tiirkkaya Ataov, The Inquisition of the Late 1980s: The Turks of Bulgaria, International 
Organization For the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, US, 1990, p. 16. 
6 The number of the other minorities at that time was the following: Pomaks 200,000-250,000; 
Gypsies 550,000. For a detailed information on the number of Bulgarian minorities, see: Hugh 
Poulton, The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict, Minority Rights Publications, 1991, p. 105. 
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Bulgarian official circles at the time that during the Ottoman Empire these people 
had been forcibly converted to Islam. The census of 1956 had revealed 17 minorities 
living in Bulgaria: Some of them were Macedonians, Vlachs, and Gypsies. 
At the end of the 1970s only Bulgarians and Turks were still named as major 
national groups.7 Between 1960 and 1976, 200,000 Pomaks were forced to change 
their Muslim names for Bulgarian ones. In the regions where Pomaks constituted the 
majority, religious schools and mosques were closed down. Islamic rituals, like 
fasting and circumcision were all prohibited. 8 Afterwards the names of Turkish 
speaking Gypsies were forcibly changed between 1981-1983. Together with them the 
names of 100,000 Turks were changed to Bulgarian ones as well. In summer 1984 
this time it was Tatars, Alewites, and Albanians who were the victims of the name-
changing campaign. 
During this time Turkish-Bulgarian relations were relatively friendly. There 
were official visits by the heads of states, namely by Kenan Evren and Todor 
Zhivkov. Most probably because of this, Turkey did not react to the first wave of 
Bulgarization campaign in any way. Ankara preferred to remain silent.9 It was 
inclined to see these events as isolated cases and could not see that in the end the 
campaign was going to hurt the Turkish minority as well. Turkey did not want to 
harm newly improving bilateral relations. 
7 Kemal H. Karpat, 'The Turks of Bulgaria: The Struggle For National-Religious Survival ofa 
Muslim Minority', Nationalities Papers, 1995, Vol. 23, No. 4, p. 730. 
8 Ali Eminov, 'There Are No Turks in Bulgaria: Rewriting History by Administrative Fiat', in Turks 
of Bulgaria: The History, Culture and Political Fate of a Minority, ISIS Press, istanbul, 1990, p. 206. 
For more information on Bulgarian campaign against Pomaks, see Poulton, op. cit., pp. 111-115. 
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3.3. The Assimilation Campaign Against the Turkish Minority 
The Bulgarian assimilation campaign against the Turkish minority had begun 
at a time when bilateral relations were still in the honeymoon period. During the 
period between 1964-1984, 21 visits had taken place at the level of heads of states, 
prime ministers and foreign ministers. Moreover, 13 bilateral agreements had been 
signed. 
At the end of 1984 there were reports claiming that Bulgaria began to force 
its Turkic people to adopt Bulgarian names instead of their Turkish names. At the 
beginning Turkey did not trust these reports, thinking that some circles were trying to 
damage Turkish-Bulgarian relations. But, then it turned out that these reports 
reflected the very truth. 10 
The assimilation campaign began with a ban on wearing traditional Turkish 
dresses and speaking Turkish in public places. Then people were forced to sign 
forms that stated they had acquired their Bulgarian names voluntarily. 11 The name-
changing campaign lasted between December 1984-March 1985. Bulgarian 
authorities started saying that the Turks had, in fact, been Slav Bulgarians who had 
been forcibly converted to Islam during the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the 
reconstruction of Bulgarian names was needed. The officials who had many times 
admitted the existence of Turkish minority before began to say that there were no 
ethnic Turks in Bulgaria. For example Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov had stated in 
1964 on the 10th anniversary of Turkish publication, Yeni Hayat: 
9 Bilal Sim~ir, 'The Latest Bulgarian Coup: (Forced) Changing of Turkish Names', Turkish Review 
Quarterly Digest, Winter 1986, Vol. 1, No. 6, pp. 151-153. 
Io The Tragedy of Turkish Muslim Minority in Bulgaria: Documents, Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara, 
1989, p. 6. 
I I Kemal Kiri~ci, 'Refugees of Turkish Origin: Coerced lnunigrants to Turkey Since 1945 ', 
International Migration, 1996, Vol. 34, No. 3, p. 392. 
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All possible opportunities have been created for the Turkish population to develop 
their culture and language freely ... The children of the Turkish population must 
learn their mother tongue and perfect it. To this end, it is necessary that the 
teaching of the Turkish language be improved in schools. Now and in the future 
the Turkish population will speak their mother tongue; they will write their 
contemporary literary works (in Turkish), they will sing their wonderfully 
beautiful songs (in Turkish) ... Many more books must be published in this country 
in Turkish, including the best works of progressive writers in Turkey. 12 
But the same Bulgarian leader was now saying in 1985 that "There are no 
Turks in Bulgaria". 13 According to the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) program 
of 1971, "the citizens of the country of different national origins will come ever 
closer together". By the mid- l 970s the term "unified Bulgarian socialist nation" 
came to be used more frequently in the official speeches and publications. The 
systematic assimilation campaign against the Turks began with official documents 
forbidding wearing of ~a/var -traditional Turkish trousers-. A document dated 3 
August 1984 concerning municipality and regions around Stambolovo, south of 
Haskovo forbade wearing ~a/var and speaking Turkish in streets, public places and 
institutions. It was pointed out that those who wore ~a/var or spoke Turkish would 
not be served in shops. It was also ordered that only Bulgarian could be spoken in 
kindergartens. But, it is interesting to note that this order referred to "the Turkish 
population". The subsequent orders denied the existence of Turks in the country. 
At the end of 1984 there were reports coming from Bulgaria, indicating that 
the assimilation campaign had begun in earnest. Arguing that the roads were blocked 
because of bad weather, foreign observers, journalists or visitor were not allowed to 
12 Poulton, op. cit., pp. 120-121. 
13 Mary Neuburger, 'Bulgaro-Turkish Encounters and the Re-imaging of the Bulgarian Nation (1878-
1995)', East European Quarterly, March 1997, Vol. 31, No. 1, p. 6. 
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visit the regions where ethnic Turks constituted the majority. These restrictions 
remained in place until late 1989.14 
The Bulgarization campaign began in the southern parts of the country, then 
was applied in the northern parts. It was carried out around Varna and Dobruja by 
January 1985. The campaign was done in the following way: Police and troops with 
tanks surrounded the regions in which Turks predominantly lived, in the early hours 
of the morning. Officials visited every house. People were forced, sometimes even at 
gunpoint, to accept their new Bulgarian names and sign forms stating that they chose 
to acquire new names voluntarily. Sometimes, people were gathered together in the 
town square and were compelled to accept new identity cards. There were many 
reports of violence and rape during the campaign. In places where Turks constituted 
the minority the campaign was carried out in a more gentle way. For example, in 
Harmanh where Turks made up only 1000 of 25,000-30,000 inhabitants the 
campaign was applied at work places, and in some cases they were given even a 
period of days to accept new names or otherwise lose jobs. 15 
Meanwhile, Bulgarian leaders consistently denied the existence of minorities 
m the country. In March 1985, Stanko Todorov, member of the BCP Central 
Committee and Politburo, Chairman of National Assembly said that Bulgaria was a 
"one-nation state" and in the Bulgarian nation "There are no parts of other peoples 
and nations." 16 
Besides that there was pressure to restrict the Islamic practices. Some 
mosques were closed down, some even destroyed. Some were turned into 
warehouses, some into museums, with the sign "Museum of Bulgarian Mussulman" 
on the doors which were locked. According to a report of the one of few foreign 
14 Poulton, op. cit., pp. 129-130. 
IS Ibid., pp. 130-131. 
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journalists allowed to visit Turkish dominated areas while the campaign was going 
on, imams who voluntarily changed their names were provided with a salary increase 
of 50 leva, thus total salary increasing from 150 to 200 leva per month. There were 
also reports of violent clashes between security forces and Turkish demonstrators 
who protested the assimilation campaign. 
It was also stated that young people were not allowed to go to mosques. 
Those who tried to faced the risk of harassment and arrest. UN Special Rapporteur 
on Religious Intolerance for the Human Rights Committee Angelo Vidal D' Almeido 
stated that Bulgaria was one of seven countries that systematically prevented 
peaceful practice of religion. There was another restriction concerning the 
circumcision. For example, Georgi Tanev, First Secretary of the Kirjaali District 
Party Committee, made clear his position on 15 May 1985 that circumcision must be 
totally abolished and "energetic measures" must be taken against "all those involved, 
and (that) the parents who allow it, all those who carry out or assist circumcision 
should be held strongly responsible. 
Regular checks were carried out on the male infants to understand whether 
they were circumcised or not. At the beginning, the fathers of circumcised children 
were imprisoned, as well as the doctors who carried out the operation. Although the 
Bulgarian authorities claimed that the punishment was only for those who made the 
operation without having any medical education, in practice it was not the case. In 
1986 the government intensified degree of violence and even mothers and 
grandmothers of circumcised children were put into prison up to five years. 17 
Bulgarian authorities even restricted the practice of fasting during Ramadan 
and tried to stop the celebrations of Ramadan and Sacrifice Religious Festivals 
16 Hugh Poulton, Who are the Macedonians, Hurst&Company, London, 1995, p. 150. 
17 Poulton, The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict, op. cit., pp. 131-136. 
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(bayram). It was reported that in the Kirjaali region the officials searched houses to 
find whether any sheep had been slaughtered. In August/September 1996 when they 
found a sheep in the refrigerator of one household, the man was imprisoned for one 
year. 18 The restrictions brought upon Turkish education in late 1950s were also 
stepped up in this period. Many Turkish teachers were dismissed and sent to manual 
labour. For instance, Ziya Osmanov, the school director in Kroyachevo, and his 
brother Selahattin Osmanov, geography teacher, were fired and employed as miners 
in Maden. 19 
There were mass demonstrations by Turks against the mounting pressure. 
But the authorities remained adamant. They used violence to stop the 
demonstrations. Some demonstrators were killed, some imprisoned, some sent to 
notorious Belene Forced Labor Camp. In reaction some Turks began hunger strike. 
The situation became extremely tense. 
3.4. Mass Exodus in 1989 
In early 1989 there were countrywide mass demonstrations by large numbers 
of Turks in Bulgaria. These demonstrations were different form previous small-scale 
protests. But Bulgarian government responded with still more repression and began 
to deport some activists to Turkey. Then it was followed by a general exodus of 
Turkish minority that took place between June-August 1989. By 1989 the authorities 
had no longer monopoly on information. Foreign radio stations could publicize 
within Bulgaria the increasing number of hunger strikes and mass demonstrations. 20 
It contributed to the widening of protests. In February 1989 Bulgaria began saying 
that anyone in Bulgaria could emigrate to any other country if he or she wanted. 
18 Ibid, p. 136. 
19 Ibid., pp. 137-139. 
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Travelling to foreign countries was legalized in May. Bulgaria's deportation of Turks 
meant admission of the fact that there had been a Turkish minority in the country and 
the attempt to Bulgarize it had not succeeded. 
Some of the deportees were given no time to see their relatives before they 
were chucked out into Turkey. They could take only few personal belongings and 
little money. They were not compensated for what they had to leave behind. After 
the first wave of deportation of activists, thousands of Bulgarian Turks began to 
come to Turkey. It can be said that they were deported and given no other chance 
than leaving the country, because their basic human rights were denied. 
After a week of hesitation, Turkey began to criticize Bulgarian regime 
concerning the mounting assimilation and deportation campaign. Beginning from 
January 1985 Ankara tried to bring the issue to the forefront of international 
diplomacy, reminding Sofia of its responsibilities according to the international 
agreements it had signed. However, Bulgarian officials rejected these criticisms, 
arguing that it was aware of its responsibilities. In fact, Turkey had been criticizing 
Bulgarian campaign against the Turks since 1985. But the unexpected deportation of 
thousands of Turks pushed the bilateral relations to a crisis point. During this crisis, 
Turkey offered Bulgaria to sign a comprehensive emigration agreement many times, 
but unfortunately Bulgaria refused it. Sofia said that it could only accept to examine 
cases on an individual basis while Turkey brought the problem on the agenda of 
many international organizations and asked Western governments for help. Actually, 
it was not for the first time that Bulgaria expelled an important part of Turkish 
minority to Turkey. The deportation of 150,000-155,000 Turks in 1950-1951 has 
similarities with that of 1989, the latter differs from only in scale. Between June-
20 Ibid., pp. 155-156. 
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August 1989 about 370,000 Turks were deported, of whom 154,000 were to return to 
Bulgaria later.21 This was the biggest migration movement not only in the history of 
Turkish emigration from Bulgaria to Turkey, but also in the post-Second World War 
period in the world. 22 
Turkey's efforts to call the world's attention to the tragic events of 1989 that 
Bulgarian regime caused was heeded by the international community only in part, 
especially at the beginning. Some countries criticized the Bulgarian government, but 
did not press Bulgaria as hard as Turkey wished. -Meanwhile, during the meeting 
with Bulgarian leader Zhivkov, the then Greek leader Papandreou stated that Greece 
and Bulgaria would cooperate on the minority issues in the international arena. It was 
claimed at the time that during this period a Sofia-Athens axes had been formed 
against Turkey. 23 Turkey was accused by other countries of using double standards. 
There was the criticism put forward against Turkey that since she was also carrying 
out human rights abuses, it did not have the right to criticize Bulgaria. 24 But it is an 
indisputable fact that Turkey's less than perfect human rights record could not be 
compared to that of systematic human rights abuses by Bulgaria and deportation of 
hundreds of thousands people. 
3.5. International Reactions 
The reactions to Bulgarian assimilation campaign began as early as in 1985. 
The 1985 report of the Council of Europe called on Bulgaria to put an immediate end 
21 Wolfgang Hopken, 'Zwischen Kulturkonflikt und Repression: Die Tiirkische Minderheit in 
Bulgarien, 1944-1991", in Nationen, Nationalitaeten, Minderheiten Probleme des Nationalismus in 
Jugoslawien, Ungarn, Rumaenien, der Tschechoslowakei, Bulgarien, Polen, der Ukraine, ltalien und 
Osterreich: 1945-1990, herausgegeben von Valeria Heuberger, Othmar Kolar, Arnold Suppan und 
Elisabeth Vyslonzi, Verlag fur Geschichte und Politik, Wien, R. ldenbourg, Verlag Miinchen, 1994, p. 
79. 
22 Darina Vasileva, 'Bulgarian Turlcish Emigration and Return', International Migration Review, Vol. 
26, No. 2, 1992, p. 342 and Reuters, 9 August 1989. 
23 Duncan M. Perry, 'New Directions for Bulgarian-Turkish Relations', RFF/RL Digital Text Archive. 
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to its repressive policy and to restore their rightful names to all members of the 
Turkish minority. 25 The 16th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in 1987, 
stated its concern as regards to reports of assimilation campaign and sent a group to 
examine the situation there. 26 
The then Turkish Prime Minister Ozal asked for help at NATO Summit in 
May 1989 and criticized member countries for not showing the traditional sensitivity 
concerning Bulgarian pressure. 27 Ozal' s appeal did not go unheeded. The US 
postponed trade negotiations with Sofia. In addition, the Council of Europe 
expressed its concern for Bulgarian campaign against Turkish minority and asked 
Bulgaria to stop her policy and to begin negotiations with Turkey with the aim of 
signing an emigration agreement. 28 
The then Foreign Minister Mesut Ytlmaz sent a letter to the UN General 
Secretary Perez de Cuellar, calling on the UN to pay utmost attention to the issue. 29 
Meanwhile, EC countries cancelled the economic and trade cooperation agreement to 
be signed with Bulgaria as a result of Turkey's efforts.Jo Both EC countries and the 
US condemned Bulgarian policy. NATO stated that Bulgaria continuously violated 
the agreements it had previously signed in the framework of European Conference 
on Security and Cooperation.JI 
The position of the Soviet Union on the issue was ambiguous. It seemed to 
remain neutral on the surface and to refrain from expressing any clear position. The 
24 The Washington Post, 6 June 1989. 
25 Ataov, The Inquisition of the Late 1980s: The Turks of Bulgaria, op. cit., p. 18. For reports on 
Bulgarian assimilation campaign by the foreign media, see World Press on the Plight of Turkish 
Minority in Bulgaria, Kurtulu~ Yaymc1hk Ticaret Ltd. Sti., Ankara, 1989. For reports of Turkish press 
on the issue, see Bilal Si~ir, Turk Baszmnda Bulgaristan TilrkJeri: Ocak-Nisan 1985, Ankara, 1985. 
26 Ataov, The Inquisition of the Late 1980s: The Turks of Bulgaria, op. cit., p. 18. 
27 Cumhuriyet, 14 June 1989. 
28 Ibid, 16 June 1989 and 8 July 1989. 
29 Ibid., 21 June 1989. 
30 Ibid., 27 June 1989. 
31 Ibid., 1July1989. 
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Soviet Ambassador to Ankara Chernyshov launched a shuttle diplomacy between 
Turkey and Bulgaria to solve the problem, 32 but to no avail. It was even argued that 
the Soviet Union tried to mediate, just because it did want to harm Turkey's efforts 
to bring the issue before the international community. 
At a time Bulgaria initiated the campaign against her Turkish minority, the 
Soviet Union was experiencing the period of glastnost (openness) and perestroika 
(restructuring). It is interesting to note that Bulgaria was to follow a different path 
from the Soviet Union in the years ahead. 33 
3.6. Reasons For the Bulgarian Assimilation Campaign in 1989 
1) Demographic reasons: Since mid-1980s Bulgaria has had the smallest 
population and lowest birth rate among all other communist countries of Eastern 
Europe.34 The growth rate of her population was consistently declining since 1980. 
While it had been 36 per 1000 in 1980, it declined to -0.35 in 1996.35 It is a very low 
figure compared to the world average 29. 0 per thousand. In contrast, Turkish 
minority has been growing at least two times higher than the Bulgarian population. 
This must have created f~ar in the Bulgarian ruling circles about ever-growing 
number of Turks in the country and its possible effect on Bulgarian politics. This fear 
seems to have contributed to the policy of expulsion. 36 Signs of this can be seen in 
the statements of Bulgarian politicians. Bulgarian leader Zhivkov claimed in the 
321bid, 27 June 1989. 
33 Ergun Balc1, 'Anadolu Y anmadasmda Ya~amarun Bedeli', Cumhuriyet, 19 June 1989. 
34 Vasileva, op. cit., p. 346. 
35 Poulton, The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict, p. 122. 
36 Ahmet Merdivenci, 'Bulgaristan'm Korkusu' Cumhuriyet, 20 June 1989. 
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meeting of Politburo on 8 May 1984 that ethnic Turks had become too many. 37 Some 
press reports of 1983 exaggerated the birth rate among Turks, saying that it was six 
times more than the Bulgarian average, probably to create a sense of discontent 
among Bulgarians. 
The leader of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF)38 that consists 
mainly of Turkish members, Ahmed Dogan, claimed in his interview with the 
Turkish Daily News that Bulgaria always tried to keep number of Turks under one 
million in terms of its "strategical interests". He claimed: "If they (Bulgarian 
officials) think number of Turks exceed one million, they will consider it a threat for 
themselves. In this case, they resort to melting down the Turkish population, 
assimilating them or opening the border."39 
Since Bulgarian officials planned a referendum to be carried out in 
December 1985, it was argued that they launched the assimilation campaign to show 
the number of Turks less. 40 
At the beginning of the deportation campaign, Bulgaria made the strategic 
calculation that whether the Turks returned or not it would be the winning side in the 
end. If they did not return, the number of Turks would have become less, their 
properties would remain in Bulgaria, and they could not get pension benefits. But if 
they returned, it would have been used as political propaganda by the government to 
show "how deteriorating economic and political conditions Turkey had."41 
37 Valeri Stojanov, 'Ausgrenzung und Integration: Die bulgarischen Tiirken nach dem Zweiten 
Weltkrieg (1944/45-1989)', Osterreichische Osthefte, Jahrgang 39, 1997, Heft 2, p. 211. 
38 Tue Movement for Rights and Freedoms that had functioned as an underground organization 
between 1985-1990 was registered as a political party in January 1990. 
39 Turkish Daily News, 16 November 1998, via Reuters, 16 November 1998. 
40 Stojanov, pp. 208-209. 
41 Karpat, Tue Turks of Bulgaria: Tue Struggle For National-Religious Survival of a Muslim Minority, 
op. cit., p. 726. 
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2) Cyprus Syndrome: Throughout its history as an independent state 
Bulgaria has had the perennial fear that Turkey would one day use the Turkish 
minority in Bulgaria to ask for territorial concessions from Bulgaria. Sofia 
governments have been inclined to claim that Turkey has had neo-Ottomanist 
aspirations, and that they have said this design of Turkey was proven in the Cyprus 
intervention of Turkey in 1974. Although this claim was far from reality, it has found 
a considerable amount of acceptance by the Bulgarians. It seems highly probable that 
Cyprus syndrome is still effective in the Bulgarian public mind, and when it deemed 
necessary by any subsequent Bulgarian government, it can be revoked.42 Some 
Bulgarian politicians clearly expressed this fear. For example, Zhivkov claimed that 
Bulgaria was threatened by Turkish terrorist groups which demanded autonomy. He 
said that 'in 10 or 20 years Bulgaria could repeat the fate of Cyprus.' 43 
3) Strategic Reasons: Bulgaria was uneasy with the fact that the border and 
adjoining areas with Turkey had been mostly populated by Turks. It wanted to deport 
Turks from these strategic regions and to populate these regions with Bulgarians 
instead. Bulgarian government believed that only in this case it could provide the 
regions with security. 44 
4) Domestic Reasons: After the reformist Mikhail Gorbachev had come to 
power in the Soviet Union in 1985, and begun to implement glasnost and perestroika 
policies, the communist regime of the Soviet Union and of other East European 
42 For a more detailed analysis on the Cyprus syndrome, see Hopken, 'Bulgarian-Turkish Relations' 
op. cit. p. 85; Karpat, 'The Turks of Bulgaria: The Struggle For National-Religious Swvival of a 
Muslim Minority', op. cit., p. 737 and Stojanov , 'Ausgrenzung und Integration: Die bulgarischen 
Tuerken nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (1944/45-1989), op. cit., p. 208. 
43 Poulton, The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict, op. cit, p. 166. 
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countries was softened. There were demonstrations in most of the communist 
countries demanding more liberal and democratic policies. Bulgaria, however, whose 
economic situation did worsen during the 1980s, did not wish to face such anti-
regime demonstrations. Therefore, she tried to suppress the Turkish minority to 
divert the attention of the public from mounting economic, political, and social 
problems and to prevent them from rebelling against the government.45 
5) Bulgarian nation formation: Ever since Bulgaria gained autonomy from 
the Ottoman Empire, it emphasized the Slavic character of the Bulgarian nation and 
seemed to ignore the fact that eponymic tribe of medieval Bulgars were Turks. 
Moreover, the nation formation in Bulgaria was based on the denigration of the years 
under the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, it was not difficult for the Bulgarian 
government to provoke Bulgarians against the Turkish minority. 46 
6) Possible Soviet Impact: Since Bulgaria was the closest ally of the Soviet 
Union, it can be argued that Bulgaria could not dare to implement the assimilation 
and deportation campaign against the Turks without clear support of the Moscow 
government. The fact that deportation campaign of 1950-1951 had been ordered by 
Stalin himself is clear evidence in this regard. 47 
44 Karpat, 'The Turks of Bulgaria: The Struggle For National-Religious Survival of a Muslim 
Minority', op. cit., p. 727. 
45 Vasileva, op. cit., p. 343 and p. 347. 
46 For a detailed analysis on the formation of Bulgarian nation, see Istvan Vasary, 'The Role of the 
Turkic Peoples in the Ethnic History of Eastern Europe', in Ethnicity and Nationalism: Case Studies 
in Their Intrinsic Tension and Political Dynamics, edited by Peter Kriiger, Hitzeroth, Marburg, 1993, 
pp. 27-34 and also Neuburger, 'Bulgaro-Turkish Encounters and the Re-imaging of the Bulgarian 
Nation (1878-1995)', pp. 1-19. 
47 Hurriyet, 10 Mart 1999, op. cit. 
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3. 7. The Fall of Zhivkov and New Era in Bulgarian Politics 
Bulgarian campaign against the Turkish minority brought about the downfall 
of Zhivkov regime. He was dismissed from leadership as Communist Party General 
Secretary by a party group led by his foreign minister and member of Politburo Petar 
Mladenov on IO November 1989, one day after the Berlin Wall fell down. As 
different from other East and Central European countries, Bulgarian communist 
regime was not overthrown by people's demonstrations, but through the reformist 
wing of the Bulgarian Communist Party. 
New leader Mladenov expressed his commitment to democratic principles, 
albeit within the limits of socialism.48 He claimed to respect the rights of 'Muslim' 
minority. 49 The new leadership relaxed the policy toward the Turks. The returning 
Turks were allowed to go back to their homes. About 50 Turks who were put into 
prison because of cricizing government policy were freed. But some Bulgarian 
nationalist groups who did not come to terms with the restoration of Turkish 
minority's rights held demonstrations throughout Bulgaria to which thousands of 
people attended. The government tried to please nationalists by recommending that 
separatist organisations and public displays of Turkish flags be banned. 50 
The assimilation campaign was formally stopped with a decree of 29 
December 1989.51 It signalled the beginning of a new era in Turkish-Bulgarian 
relations. 
48 Cumhuriyet, 12 Kas1m 1989. 
49 Cumhuriyet, 6 Arallk 1989. 
50 Poulton, The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict, op. cit., pp. 163-165. 
51 Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 217. 
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CHAPTER IV 
TURKISH-BULGARIAN RELATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 
4.1. Bulgarian Foreign Policy in the New Period 
After the overthrow of the communist leader Zhivkov, Bulgaria regranted the 
rights of her Turkish minority. After years of denial it came to recognize the 
existence of Turkish minority and its rights to to have Turkish names, to practice 
Islam freely and to have education in their mother language. AfEr taking power, new 
leader Mladenov immediately apologized for, and repudiated, the assimilation 
campaign which had come to an end by a decree of December 1989. Although there 
were some demonstrations by nationalist Bulgarians, the new government did not 
give in to them. 1 
The period after November 1989 heralded the beginning of a new period in 
Bulgarian both domestic and foreign policies. The fall of Berlin Wall, and 
immediately after that, the end of communism in Bulgaria were two important 
turning points in this regard. The fall of the Berlin Wall symbolized the end of Cold 
War between two world superpowers. With the end of old enmities between two 
blocs, Bulgaria lost the support of its big brother, i.e. its closest ally the Soviet 
Union. 
During the Cold War it was impossible for Bulgaria to act independently of 
the Moscow regime. But now it could act freely. It was at a time, when all Eastern 
and Central European communist governments were falling down one by one. In 
1 Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 217. 
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such political environment Bulgaria felt alone and and sought to regain the trust of its 
neighbors. 
At that time the Soviet Union was dealing with its own internal problems. 
The constituting republics, thanks to the glastnost and perestroika policies of the then 
Soviet leader Gorbachev and mounting economic problems, wanted to gain their 
independence. There were pro-independence demonstrations all over the country. In 
such political climate of trying to preserve unity, Moscow had to let the former allied 
countries go their own way, and also to let the two Germanies unite. 
Another factor that led Bulgaria to change its policies radically was the 
damage that was caused by the assimilation process. It had resulted in the isolation of 
the country on the international arena. Western governments and many international 
organizations had condemned Bulgaria harshly. In addition, there had emerged also 
domestic opposition movements, like the Discussion Club for the Support of 
Perestroika and Glastnost, the Independent Association for Human Rights m 
Bulgaria, Ecoglastnost, an independent trade union named Podkrepa (support) and 
the Committee for the Defense of Religious Rights. 
Mladenov, being aware of the damage of Zhivkov's policies upon Bulgaria, 
led the coup against Zhivkov, apparently with the support of Gorbachev. On 26 
October 1989, Bulgarian police manhandled a group of demonstrators who were 
holding an ecological protest before foreign journalists. It diminished the credibility 
of the government more. Mladenov, using this event as an opportunity, after his visit 
to China landed in Moscow and talked to Gorbachev. Immediately after his return to 
Sofia he carried out a "palace coup" against Zhivkov. Therefore, one could draw the 
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conclusion that the Soviet Union supported the fall of Zhivkov and his repressive 
regime.2 
In the new period Bulgaria found itself in a security vacuum. Throughout its 
recent history it has almost always acted on a close ally of one great power. It had 
gained its autonomy from the Ottoman Empire thanks to the support of the Russian 
Empire. In both World Wars it fought on the side of Germany. After the Second 
World War, it became a satellite of the Soviet Union. But after 1989 for the first 
time, it has had the alternative to act independently of great powers.3 Especially after 
the disbandment of military institutions of the Warsaw Pact on March 3 1, 1991 and 
dissolution of the Pact on July 1 the same year, it had to follow a new path in its 
foreign policy in compliance with the new state of affairs in world politics. It had 
few alternatives in this regard, like the following ones: 
a) Reestablishment of the cooperation with Soviet Union: It could continue to 
seek close cooperation with Moscow in foreign policy and military issues. The 
Soviet Union had already declared its willingness to complete a treaty with Bulgaria 
in this context. It would replace the treaty signed with Zhivkov and his Soviet 
counterpart Leonid Brezhnev in 1967. In May 1991, Bulgarian media reported that a 
draft of such a treaty was completed by the foreign ministries of these two countries. 
When the content of it was leaked by the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry, it became clear 
that Moscow aimed at achieving close cooperation with Bulgaria, including military 
cooperation and prohibiting Bulgaria's membership to other alliances that might be 
hostile to the Soviet Union. In fact, there were some politicians and military officials 
2 Ibid., pp. 214-216. 
3 Duncan M. Perry, Bulgaria: Security Concerns and Foreign Policy Considerations in The Volatile 
Powder Keg: Balkan Security After the Cold War, edited by F. Stephen Larrabee, a RAND Study, 
American University Press, 1994, p. 59. 
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in Bulgaria who favored such a plan. The then Foreign Minister Viktor Valkov and 
Defense Minister Y ordan Mutafchiev recommended in their report to the 
government, dated February 26, 1991, that the draft should be approved quickly so 
that negotiations would immediately begin. In addition, one member of the National 
Security Council, Major General Kamen Petrov claimed that a treaty with the Soviet 
Union was essential to Bulgaria's security. Moreover, the former Soviet ambassador 
to Bulgaria, Viktor Shapanov, argued that the agreement should include military 
cooperation as well. 
However, public opinion did not seem to be in favor of such a treaty that 
would make Bulgaria once more a satellite of the Soviet power. Apparently, because 
of the public opposition to the draft, Bulgarian Prime Minister Popov said that the 
proposal of the Soviet government to conclude treaties with its former East bloc 
allies was "not very much to the taste of sovereign countries". Although the idea of 
concluding a treaty with Moscow was not given up, in June President Zhelev said 
that it would be only a bilateral friendship treaty without any military provisions. He 
declared that the old Soviet-Bulgar treaty would not be renewed. 
At that time NATO had made it clear that it would not look favorably to the 
creation of spheres of influence in Europe. Having said that, however, NATO's then 
Secretary General Manfred Worner was quick to warn the Sofia government against 
making rash decisions during his visit to Bulgaria. On the one hand, he said that 
Bulgaria was free to sign any treaty it wanted, on the other hand, he warned that it 
should expect that any such move would affect its relations with NAT0.4 The 
coming months of 1991 brought about certain changes both in Bulgarian and 
international politics. In the early elections of 1991, the Union of Democratic Forces 
4 Kjell Engelbrekt., 'Redefining National Security in the New Political Environment', Report on 
Eastern Europe, 26 July 1991, Vol. 2, No. 30, pp. 4-8. 
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came out victorious. This party was in favor of closer relations with the Western 
countries and institutions, and also of more liberalization in the economy. At the 
international level, the most important event of 1991 was the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union in December. In such an environment of pro-Western orientation of the 
public opinion in general, Bulgaria could not conclude proposal of close military 
cooperation with Moscow. 
b) Neutrality: The policy of neutrality had been adopted only by Yugoslavia in the 
region. Since Bulgaria has been a small country, it has always sought admission to 
alliances. Especially after 1989, in the period of transition, when Bulgaria certainly 
needed both political and economic support from the outside world, it was not a 
realistic choice for Bulgaria to pursue policy of neutrality in the international arena. 
c) Cooperation with the Western world: In the aftermath of Zhivkov period, 
Bulgaria expressed many times its desire to be a member of NATO and to implement 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation projects, despite the fact that between 1990-
1997, except for 8 months, it was governed by Bulgarian Socialist Party, former 
communists. Actually this was the path that Bulgaria has chosen to implement in 
assuring its security in the region in the post-Cold War era. 
In August 1990, Dobri Jurov, the then Bulgarian Defense Minister, declared 
for the first time that there was the possibility of Bulgaria joining NATO some day. 
Later the same month, on August 30, the Bulgarian Ambassador to Belgium, Atanas 
Ginev, was accredited to NATO Headquarters in Brussels. The then Bulgarian 
Foreign Minister Lyuben Gotsev, who was also an important figure in the Bulgarian 
Socialist Party, paid an official visit to Belgium to meet with NATO Secretary-
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General Worner. In December 1990, a technocratic government was formed in 
Bulgaria after the withdrawal of the socialist one. In March 1991 a retired US Army 
General Charles Dyke went to Sofia on an official visit, an indication of NATO 
initiative towards formerly communist Eastern and Central European countries. 
In June 1991, Worner paid an official visit to Bulgaria that was 
acknowledged as a great success by both sides. During the visit, he repeated several 
times that NATO considered Bulgaria an important part of Europe, politically and 
culturally, and he warned that its borders were not to be violated. He also stated that 
NATO wanted to establish closer political and military relations with Bulgaria. He 
declared that Bulgarian military officers would soon go to NATO military schools. 
One journalist evaluated Worner's statements on Bulgaria as a kind of "psycotherapy 
at a national level". 5 A few weeks before his visit, more than a third of deputies in 
the Bulgarian Grand National Assembly had issued a statement asking the 
government for making an official application for NATO membership.6 
Bulgaria had realized the fact that to achieve an alliance with the West was 
to be dependent on whether Sofia government was prepared to reverse the 
assimilation policies against Turkish minority in the 1980s and solve its problems 
with the neighboring countries, especially with Turkey. At that stage, Bulgaria's 
President Zhelev came out in support of good relations with Turkey. He said for the 
first time in Bulgarian history that small states had a genuine opportunity to ensure 
their security and national sovereignty within the framework of regional and global 
arrangements. He emphasized the fact that the strategy of seeking the support of a 
great power "to which we would become a satellite, and which, in exchange for our 
5 Ibid., p. 5. 
6 Ibid., pp. 4-8. 
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loyalty and servitude, would guarantee our national security" was no longer valid. He 
considered it as a "great chance". 7 
In the aftermath of the Cold War, Bulgaria tried to forge close ties with the 
Western world many times. It has had troops in Cambodia as part of a UN 
peacekeeping mission. It offered the US and its allies to assist during the Gulf War, 
gave up a multi-billion dollar contract with Iraq. It even observed embargo against 
Libya and Yugoslavia at substantial cost.8 
Bulgaria's rapprochement with Turkey in the 1990s must only be understood 
within the framework of Bulgaria's Westernization attempts. In such an environment 
the relations between Turkey and Bulgaria began to improve. It must also be noted 
that in the same period Bulgaria tried to improve her relations with Greece as well, 
and pursued a balanced policy with the two countries. 9 
The post-Cold War foreign policy of Bulgaria can be summarized with the 
words of the former foreign minister of Bulgaria Stanislav Daskalov: 
I think that the purpose of foreign policy is a simple one: to protect the 
country's national interests acting in compliance with the internationally 
accepted standards. There are different means of achieving this purpose. Be it 
through integration with the European structures or by expanding the 
country's relations with its neighbors, being a European country situated in 
the Balkans, Bulgaria has interests in this aspect, too. 10 
The contemporary Bulgarian foreign policy is based on four pillars: 
7 Ibid., p. 5. 
8 Perry, Bulgaria: Security Concerns and Foreign Policy Considerations, op. cit., pp. 58-59. 
9 Sabine Riedel, 'Bulgariens aufienpolitische Optionen', Siidosteuropa Mitteilungen, 33. Jahrgang, 
Heft 4, 1993, pp. 301-303. 
10 Stephane Lefebvre, 'Bulgaria's Foreign Relations in the Post-Communist era: A General Overview 
and Assessment', East European Quarterly, XXVIII, No: 4, January 1995, p. 454. 
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The end of the implementation of communist ideology, 1.e. de-
ideologization, 
European orientation (implementation of Western European approaches 
to intenational problems), 
democratization of foreign policy thanks to consensus and transparency, 
pragmatism and rationality in the decision-making process. 
In considering the Balkan policy of Bulgaria, we can add two more pillars: 
- multi-lateralism (avoiding alliances with a regional power) 
equidistance (no participation in regional conflicts). 11 
4.2. Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era 
Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Turkey's foreign 
policy has always been based upon maintenance of independence and preservation of 
secularism and modernism. 12 Its basic principle has been its Western orientation. 13 
In the Cold War period Turkey was an ally of the Western club. It became a 
member of most of the Western institutions, in terms of security, most important of 
them being NATO. In this period, Turkish foreign policy was to a large extent 
dependent on that of the allies. Except in the case of the Cyprus problem, Turkey 
followed the policy adopted by NATO. 
As the Cold War was about to end, Turkish foreign policy faced a major 
crisis with regard to Bulgaria: the regeneration process in Bulgaria and following 
exodus of Turks from Bulgaria to Turkey. In that conflict that hurt Turkey's interests 
considerably, Turkey pursued a rational policy of condemning Bulgarian attitude and 
11 Ibid., 454-455. 
12 Turkish Foreign Policy: Some Introductory Remarks in Turkish Foreign Policy, edited by Kemal H. 
Karpat, Madison, Wisconsin, 1996, p. 1. 
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trying to create an international reaction. Although at the beginning, support by 
Western countries and organizations could not be mobilized, in the following months 
of exodus Western powers did come to condemn Bulgaria and impose some 
economic sanctions. Although Turkey did pursue an activist policy during the crisis, 
it did not advocate military intervention at all, neither by itself, nor other countries. 
This careful policy proved to the Bulgarian establishment that Ankara did not 
constitute a threat, and that it did provide an appropriate ground for the improvement 
of bilateral relations in the new era. 14 
The Balkans play a very important role in Turkish foreign policy. First of all, 
because of the fact that it is a Balkan country; an important part of it, namely Eastern 
Thrace, is situated in the Balkans. Second, the Ottoman Empire ruled significant part 
of the Balkans for more than four hundred years. Therefore, it is inevitable that 
today's Turkey has had some undeniable cultural, economic, and political 
connections to the region. Third, about 2 million Turks or related Muslim 
communities live in other countries of the region. Fourth, because of the population 
movements since 19th century till today, 1/5 of Turkey's population is of Balkan 
origin. Fifth, instability in the Balkans would certainly have effect on Turkey. "New 
Balkan war" scenarios often include Turkey and in case of a crisis in the Balkans, 
there is always the possibility of mass migration to Turkey. Sixth, the Balkans is on 
Turkey's way to Europe. 15 Two additional factors have influenced Turkey's Balkan 
13 Oral Sander, 'Turkish Foreign Policy: Forces of Continuity and of Change', Turkish Review 
Quarterly Digest, Winter 1993, Vol. 7, No. 3-4, p. 31. 
14 Kemal Kiri~~i. 'The End of the Cold War and Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy Behaviour', 
Foreign Policy, 1993, Vol. XVII, No: 3-4, pp. 15-16. 
15 $ule Kut, Turkey in the Post - communist Balkans: Between Activism and Self-Restraint, Turkish 
Review of Balkan studies OBIV, Annual 1996-97, No. 3 pp. 41-42 and also Ali Karaosmanoglu, Die 
neue regionale Rolle der Tiirkei, Europa Arch iv, 48 Jahr, Folge 15, 10 August 1993, p. 4 25. 
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policy in the new era: A growing affection among Muslims in the Balkan countries 
for Turkey and determination not to give an image of irredentism and adventurism. 16 
During the Bosnian War, Turkey was active, particularly at the beginning. It 
tried to bring the plight of the Muslims to the attention of the world community. It 
favored military intervention by the international community and lifting of the arms 
embargo on Bosnia - Herzegovina. After the war in Bosnia came to an end, Turkey 
took part in the NATO Implementation Force (!FOR) and Stabilization Force 
(SFOR) and also was involved in the reconstruction of the region. It had also taken 
part in the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) during the War. But in doing all this, 
Turkey was very careful not to give the impression that it aimed at creating neo-
Ottoman zone of influence. 17 Turkey also tried to establish economic cooperation 
with the countries of the region with the belief that economic prosperity would 
contribute greatly to the stabilitization of the region. A good example of it was the 
Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) that was initiated by Turkey. 
4.3. Post-Zhivkov Developments in Turkish-Bulgarian Relations 
After Zhivkov had been ousted from his post, the Bulgarian Communist Party 
remained in power. However, under the leadership of Mladenov it tried to distance 
itself from the legacy of the Zhivkov regime. 
In the beginning of December 1989, Mladenov stated that Bulgaria would 
respect the rights of "Muslim minority". 18 Bulgarian former Consul General to 
istanbul Slavi Slavov said that they would like to give back all rights of the Turkish 
16 Shireen Hunter, "Bridge or Frontier? Turkey's Post-Cold War Geopolitical Posture', The 
International Spectator, Vol. XXXIV, No. 1, January-March 1999, p. 73. 
17 Sule Kut, Turkey in the Post-communist Balkans, op. cit., p. 43. 
18 Cumhuriyet, 6 December 1989. 
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speaking "Muslim minority" 19 He also said that those Turks who would return to 
Bulgaria would be able reclaim their jobs and property. 20 On the other hand, the 
Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party condemned the assimilation 
campaign as "grave political error".21 The Central Committee also agreed to end 
suppression of religious and ethnic minorities. 22 
Turkey welcomed Bulgaria's decision of abandoning its policy of 
assimilation of Turkish minority. But it remained cautious. The fact that there were 
demonstrations by Bulgarian nationalists against the restoration of the rights of 
Turkish minority and Bulgaria's reluctance to use the word "Turkish minority" 
instead of Muslim, created doubts on the Turkish side about Bulgaria's real 
intentions. Meanwhile, the then Foreign Minister of Bulgaria Boika Dimitrov 
claimed that Bulgaria would not recognize the existence of Turkish minority in the 
country. In this atmospere of uncertainty Turkey preferred to wait. Nevertheless, it 
made clear that the only barrier to the bilateral relations was Bulgaria's attitute 
toward Turks in the country. If they really changed it, Turkey would be ready to 
coooperate. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union declared its support for the Bulgarian 
policy of returning rights to Turkish minority. It stated that this was a right step, and 
that Bulgaria should avoid attitudes that would damage the national consensus. 23 
The second round of meeting between former Turkish Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Mesut Y 1lmaz and his Bulgarian counterpart in Kuwait bore some fruit. 
Bulgarian Foreign Minister Boiko Dimitrov, saying that "We want to turn a page 
between Bulgarian and Turkey", suggested that the two countries make a joint 
declaration on human rights to overcome years of annoyance over the treatment of 
19 Mi/liyet, 3 January 1990. 
20 Reuters, 3 January 1990. 
21 Reuters 29 December 1989. 
22 Reuters 31December1989. 
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Bulgaria's Turkish minority. Y1lmaz declared that "for the first time" the two 
countries used a common language. In this meeting Bulgarian Foreign Minister also 
proposed confidence building measures between the two countries in the military 
sphere. This proposal that could be achieved only between two allies really surprised 
Turkey. After the meeting Turkish diplomats said that Bulgarian policy had changed 
much more than what they had previously expected.24 Yilmaz underlined the 
possibility that "after the new decisions of Bulgaria, new era in bilateral relations 
would begin. 
The year of 1990 witnessed the first steps towards democratization taken by 
the government of Bulgaria. In January 15, the Bulgarian Communist Party gave up 
its decade-long monopoly of power. In March the Bulgarian Parliament adopted 
unanimously the law that allowed the return of ethnic Turks' and other Muslim 
peoples' right to use their own names again. And in April the Bulgarian Communist 
Party renamed itself as the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). It is important to note 
that in December 1989 a liberal and democracy-oriented party was formed, called the 
Union of Democratic Forces, consisting of different dissident groups. Bulgaria held 
its first free elections in June 1990. But it was the BSP which won the elections and 
was able to form the government alone. The Movement for Rights and Freedoms 
(MRF) whose members consisted mainly of Turks got 23 seats in the Parliament. 
The new government continued to try to approach Turkey. 
There were four main reasons that caused Bulgaria to seek rapprochement 
with Turkey after the ouster of Zhivkov: First, as it was stated before, Bulgaria chose 
to move closer to Western world after the Cold War. In this new international arena, 
to assure the country's security, Bulgaria sought admission to NATO. Therefore, it 
23 Milliyet 9 January 1990. 
24 Reuters, 10 January 1990. 
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tried to get Turkey's full support to be a member of NATO. Second, without the 
Soviet support, Bulgaria could feel vulnerable to the Turkish military power, that has 
second biggest army in NATO after the US.25 It appeared more rational to Bulgaria 
to have good relations with that neighbour to feel more secure. Third, the existence 
of Turkish minority within the borders of Bulgaria does make the contacts between 
two countries vital. The assimilation campaign of 1980 did not only damage bilateral 
relations, but also Bulgaria's relations with the Western world and Islamic countries. 
Therefore, to get out of isolation, Bulgaria should restore the rights of Turks and also 
improve its relations with Turkey. Fourth, Bulgaria's economy declined throughout 
1980s and got a fatal blow by the mass migration to Turkey. To improve 
economically, it had to get foreign investment, credits and also increase foreign 
trade. Because of geographical proximity and its successful liberalization program of 
1980's, Turkey could be an appropriate trade partner for Bulgaria. 
4.3.1. Military Relations 
Before the elections of June 1990 in Bulgaria, President of Turkey, Ozal, 
stated that Turkey wanted to have friendly relations with Bulgaria irrespective of the 
outcome of elections. 3 months later, on September 7, Bulgarian Prime Minister 
Andrey Lukanov paid an official visit to Turkey. He discussed the normalization of 
relations with Ozal and other officials. After the elections, relations improved 
considerably. In July 1990, a Turkish army inspection team visited Bulgaria. Shortly, 
thereafter, Chief of Bulgarian General Staff, Lieutenant General Radnyu Minchev, 
25 Kjell Engelbrekt, Movement for Rights and Freedoms to Compete in Elections, Report on Eastern 
Europe, 4 October 1991, Vol. 2, No. 40 p. 2. 
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paid an official visit to Turkey, first of its kind since the beginning of communist 
period in Bulgaria. 26 
The presidential elections of August 1990 should be seen as a turning point as 
regards to Turkish - Bulgarian bilateral contacs. The former dissident Zhelu Zhelev 
who at the time condemned Zhivkov' s assimilation policies became President as a 
result of these elections. The beginning of his term of presidency appeared to reduce 
the doubts of Turkey with regard to Bulgarian attempts of rapprochement. The 
meeting between Ozal and his counterpart, Zhelev, at the United Nations World 
Summit for Children in New York on September 19, 1990, must be regarded as a 
great step forward in newly developing relations between the two countries. 
Afterwards, a delegation from Bulgarian General Staff visited Turkey in November 
1990 to exchange military experiences. This kind of a visit could not even be 
imagined a year earlier. It is interesting to note that although Bulgaria had a socialist 
government at that time that was successor to the Communist Party, there emerged a 
friendly environment between Sofia and Ankara. On December 1, 1990 Ozal 
proposed that the two countries conclude a nonaggression pact. In fact, the Bulgarian 
side had proposed such a pact at the meeting in Kuwait on January 8-9, 1990, 
however, it had been rejected by Turkey at that time, on the grounds that Turkey did 
not have any claims to Bulgaria's territory, and that Sofia government should first 
take steps to improve the situation of the Turkish minority. After the Turkish 
proposal, an official from the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry stated that his government 
would prefer a broader European security arrangement involving both states. 27 
26 Duncan M Perry "New Directions for Turkish - Bulgarian Relations", RFEIRL Digital Text 
Archive. 
27 Kjell Engelbrekt, "Relations With Turkey: A Review of Post - Zhivkov Devolepments ", Report on 
Eastern Europe, April 26, 1991. 
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Until the early elections of April 1997, Bulgaria could not achieve political 
stability. The life span of governments became very short. The pending economic 
reforms and subsequent economic crisis created public animosity towards 
goverments. That is why Lukanov government that resigned in November 1990 was 
replaced by independent Dimitar Popov government consisting of technocrats. Popov 
said that the government would give full rights to Turks, but did not decide yet on the 
issue of Turkish language courses in schools, because of significant opposition by 
nationalist Bulgarians. He claimed in an interview published in Ruse Dnes on 8 
December 1990 that, "Muslim aggression is starting now, and it must be somehow 
blocked so that it does not invade Europe." These remarks, not much publicized at 
the time, that were possibly aiming to divert the attention of the public from 
economic problems, did not damage recently improving Turkish - Bulgarian 
relationship. Bilateral relations continued to improve. 
In December 1990 the two sides concluded a confidence building agreement. 
In addition, Turkish officers visited troops and installations in Harmanh, Bulgaria in 
May 1991.28 In the same month Bulgarian Vice Prime Minister and Foreign Minister 
Viktor Valkov visited Ankara. Meanwhile, Zhelev's proposal in November forging 
closer ties was realized by the conclusion of a military agreement the following 
month. Turkey and Bulgaria signed an important pact in December 1991, agreeing to 
give each other advance notice of major military activities taking place between 60 
kms of their common border and to permit military observers from either side to 
monitor manoeuvres in that area, if they involved more than 12.000 troops, 300 tanks 
and 250 artillery pieces. It was signed during the former Turkish Chief of General 
Staff's visit to Sofya. General Giire~ declared that the document signed was a 
28 Perry, "New Directions for Bulgarian - Turkish Relations", op. cit. 
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significant step forward in the relations and would contribute to peace and stability in 
the region. 29 He added that "we have smashed the steel chains between Turkey and 
Bulgaria. The rest is easy." In addition, Bulgarian Defense Minister Dimitor Lujev 
commented in March 1992 that "Turkey is not an opponent country any longer."30 
The victory of the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) in the early elections 
of October 1991 could provide Turkey with more trust regarding its relations with 
Bulgaria, since this party was formed as a reaction and also alternative to the 
Zhivkov's policies. The Union of Democratic Forces had been advocating a Western 
path for Bulgaria to follow. In the elections the Union of Democratic Forces got 34 
% support, a little ahead of the Bulgarian Socialist Party with 33%. The Movement 
for Rights and Freedoms won about 7.5 % support, getting 24 deputies, 10% of the 
whole. 31 The government formed by UDF was considered as being more reliable for 
Turkey. It was the first time in Bulgaria that both presidency and prime ministership 
were in the hands of reform-oriented forces. In March 1992 military cooperation 
continued between two countries. During his visit to Turkey, Bulgarian Defence 
Minister stated that Bulgaria considered Turkey as a partner for building a new world 
in the Balkans. His Turkish counterpart Nevzat Ayaz declared that a democratic, 
stable, reliable Bulgaria was a certain gain for Turkey, and that Turkish minority 
would act as a bridge.32 In the same month the then Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet 
~etin went to Sofia, being the first visit by a Turkish Foreign Minister to Bulgaria in 
10 years. 
On 6 May 1992, the two countries signed the Treaty of Friendship, Good-
Neighbourliness, Cooperation and Security. Turkish Defence Minister Nevzat 
19 Reuters, 20 December 1991. 
30 Perry, "New Directions for Bulgarian -Turkish Relations", op. cit. 
31 Nurcan Ozgfir, Bulgaristan Siyasal Ya§ammda Hakve Ozgarliikler Hareketi (1989-1995), istanbul 
Dniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitiisti, Yiiksek Lisans Tezi, 1996, p. 163. 
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Ayaz' s visit to Sofia in 11 March, the first by a Turkish defence minister in 100 
years, was a clear proof of the improvement of military relations between Turkey and 
Bulgaria. During this visit the Agreement for Military and Technical Cooperation 
was signed, according to which the two countries would buy jointly designed or 
produced equipment and sell jointly produced articles to third countries. 33 
The close military relationship was strengthened by joint manoeuvres, for 
example the one, Poyraz 1-94, carried out between the naval forces of two countries 
in the Black Sea.34 The military cooperation between Ankara and Sofia was not 
limited to exchange of personnel and training of staff in the other country; it also 
covered cooperation against drug and other kind of smuggling, terrorism, and 
organized crime, also exchange of information and documents.35 
It is worth noting that in those two years time Bulgarian-Turkish relations had 
improved so much that it was considered as a model for other countries. The former 
Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet <;etin stated the following during his visit to Sofia: 
"Bulgarian-Turkish relations today could serve as an example of cooperation 
between two neighboring countries which have left behind those events which cast a 
shadow on them in the years preceding 1989". He stated that the relationship could 
be held up as an example to the rest of the world and Balkans. During his visit, 
Hikmet <;etin gave a message from the Turkish President Demirel to the Bulgarian 
President Zhelu Zhelev, expressing Turkey's support for Bulgaria's admission to 
NATO when the time came.36 This was a sign that Turkey at that time was 
considering Bulgaria as a reliable partner with whom Ankara could cooperate within 
NATO. 
32 Reuters, 17 March 1992. 
33 Reuters, 24 May 1993. 
34 FBIS, Joint Exercises with Bulgaria in Black Sea, 6 July 1994. 
35 Reuters, 3 February 1993. 
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In return for the support of Turkey for Bulgarian membership of NATO, one 
of the things that Turkey wanted from Bulgaria was the prohibition of PKK activities 
in that country. At the beginning of 1994, Bulgarian Anti-Terror Department 
Director Feodor Vladiminov said that they had met with Turkish officials in July 
1993 and concluded a cooperation protocol against international terrorist 
organizations. He stated that for security reasons the matter had been kept in secret 
so far. During the meeting Turkish delegation briefed their Bulgarian colleagues on 
the PKK in Turkey and presented detailed information on its connections in 
Europe.37 
The post-1989 period in Bulgaria was characterised by political and 
economic instabilities until the early elections of April 1997. The average term of 
governments was about only one year. After the resignation of Prime Minister 
Dimitrov in October 1992, two months later the cabinet of the experts was formed 
under the leadership of Lyuben Berov. But it was forced to resign in September 
1994. December 1994 elections brought the Bulgarian Socialist Party to the power 
once more. Bulgaria appeared to take Turkey's sensitivity on terrorism issue into 
account. The new BSP government gave assurances that it would not allow 
preparation of terrorist acts against Turkey on its territory. 38 
Both countries stressed the fact that their improving relations were not 
directed against any third country, namely Greece. During his visit to Sofia in July 
1995, President Demirel pointed out that the rapprochement between these two 
countries was not against any third country. 39 On the other hand, Bulgarian President 
Zhelev said that they insisted on having equally good relations with Greece and 
36 Reuters, 11December1993. 
37 Reuters, 18 January 1994. 
38 Reuters, 25 May 1995. 
39 Reuters, 6 July 1995. 
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Turkey. Any attempt to disturb this balance of Bulgaria's Balkan policy to the 
detriment of one of these two countries for partisan considerations would be 
disastrous for Bulgaria's foreign policy. 40 At that time Bulgaria tried to play the role 
of even a mediator as regards to problems between Turkey and Greece. In July 1996 
Bulgarian Defence Ministry Press Office said that Bulgaria was concerned with the 
relations between Turkey and Greece. Bulgaria was said to be in favor of finding a 
quick solution to Turkish-Greek problems of the negotiating table. However, since 
Bulgaria has not been so much powerful to mediate between two countries, it was not 
successful in this attempt. 
4.3.2. The War in Yugoslavia and Turkish-Bulgarian Relations 
The death of Yugoslavia's charismatic leader Josip Broz Tito in 1980 can be 
considered as the beginning of the crisis in the Yugoslav Federation. Tito's rational 
policies of workers' self-management, economic decentralization and neutrality in 
international relations kept together the six republics, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia, and also autonomous regions of 
Kosovo and Vojvodina. Tito's personality did assure the flow of Western credits to 
the country. After he had died, Yugoslavia was thrown into an acute economic crisis 
that led to more autonomy demands of relatively richer republics, Croatia and 
Slovenia, on the one hand, and requests of more centralization by the Serb-
dominated federal government, on the other. That tension resulted in war waged by 
Serbian forces (JNA) against Croatia and Slovenia. However, this war accelerated 
the dissolution. Late 1991 Germany recognised Croatia and Slovenia that was 
followed by other member countries of the European Union. 
40 Reuters, 7 July 1995. 
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By April 1992 Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina declared their 
independence, too. 41 This time Serbian aggression turned towards Muslims and 
Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The new Yugoslavia consisting of mainly Serbia and 
Montenegro continued to wage war against Bosnia for 3.5 years until the conclusion 
of US-brokered Dayton Peace Accord. 
As it has already been stated, Turkey did pursue an assertive policy during 
the Bosnian crisis. It tried to mobilize the Western world to stop the aggression in 
Bosnia. Turkey was on the side of the Western countries and applied every measure 
adopted by the international community to stop the cycle of violence there. 
Even though Yugoslav trade had accounted for 10-12 % of Bulgaria's entire 
foreign trade, Sofia also implemented the UN sanctions against Yugoslavia. 42 The 
embargo cost Bulgaria 40 million US dollars per month. It hurt Bulgaria's 
transportation to the West, therefore its tourism and foreign investment as well. 43 At 
the beginning of the crisis in Yugoslavia, both Bulgaria and Turkey supported the 
territorial integrity of the country, fearing possible consequences that the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia might cause in the Balkan peninsula, like the emergence 
of other ethnic or religious conflicts in the region. But, since keeping Yugoslavia 
together turned out to be an impossible task, both countries did not hesitate to 
recognize new entities. Although Bulgaria criticised Turkey's and also other Balkan 
countries' sending soldiers to the peacekeeping force in Bosnia. 44 Ankara and Sofia 
acted in collusion during much of Bosnian crisis, particularly at the outset. 
41 Roger East and Jolyon Pontin, Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe, Pinter 
Publishers Ltd., London, 1997, pp. 233-240. 
42 Reuters, 25 June 1992. 
43 For negative effects of UN embargo on Bulgaria, see Veneta Montscheva, Bulgarien und das UN-
Embargo gegen Serbien und Montenegro, Sadosteuropa Mitteilungen, 33. Jahrgang, Heft 4, 1993, pp. 
314-317. 
44 Nurcan Ozgiir, 1989 Sonras1 Tiirkiye-Bulgaristan ili~leri, in Turk D1~ Politikas1mn Analizi, edited 
by Faruk Sonmezoglu, Der Yaymlan, 2. Bas1m, istanbul, 1998, p. 363. 
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Bosnia was not the only area m former Yugoslavia where Turkey and 
Bulgaria collaborated. Bulgaria was the first country that recognized the 
independence of Macedonia, with the reservation that it did not recognize 
Macedonian entity and Macedonian nation. In the past Bulgaria had had some claims 
over Macedonia. Therefore, it was really a positive sign for Bulgaria not to create a 
sentimental issue out of that. Greece, in contrast, saw in the declaration of 
independence by Macedonia a threat to its sovereignty, because of having a region 
called by the same name, Macedonia. The then Bulgarian Foreign Minister Ganev 
said: "Greek failure to recognize Macedonia is a really serious problem. Those who 
don't recognize create the possibility of its being territorially divided."45 
The issue of Bosnia-Herzegovina was brought to the agenda during official 
visits. When Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet <;etin visited Sofia in March 1992, 
both countries called on others to recognize independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina to 
avoid further escalation of the conflict.46 Bulgarian former Foreign Minister Stoyan 
Ganev stated the following: "If the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina was 
recognized by other countries besides Bulgaria and Turkey, the situation there would 
be much better." Bulgaria recognized independent Bosnia-Herzegovina on 15 
January 1992, together with independence of Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia. 
President Zhelev called on the West to intervene militarily to stop fighting and 
warned that if conflict spread to Macedonia, it would be difficult to prevent the 
involvement ofBulgaria.47 
45 Reuters, 9 September 1992. 
46 Reuters, 31 March 1992. 
4.4. Bulgarian Policy Toward Turkish Minority, the Movement for Rights and 
Freedoms and Its Effect Upon Relations Between Turkey and Bulgaria 
After ousting Zhivkov, Bulgaria restored the rights of he Turkish minority to 
a considerable extent. This new policy destroyed the biggest barrier to improved 
bilateral relations between Turkey and Bulgaria. Although at the beginning, Turkey 
could not trust Bulgaria completely, when it came to notice real improvement in the 
situation of Turks, it responded to Bulgarian attempts of rapprochement positively. 
However, Turkey was worried about the demonstrations of some ethnic Bulgarians 
protesting return of rights to Turkish minority. In this situation Bulgaria did achieve 
to maintain a sensitive balance between returning rights to Turkish minority and 
reactions of Bulgarian nationalists who seemed to be still under the effects of the 
propaganda of the communist period. 
Since 1990, more than 920 mosques have opened. Religious literature, 
including Koran, both in Bulgarian and Turkish is being published freely. Study of 
Turkish language in schools, although as extracurriculum, has been reintroduced. 
Publication of Turkish newspapers, magazines, national radio broadcasts, daily 
programmes in Turkish have also been allowed. 48 Bulgaria has adopted a new 
constitution in 1991, that does not recognize special rights for minorities, but 
guarantees human rights of all individuals living in the country. 49 
Another factor that has contributed to the promotion of minority rights and 
peaceful integration of Turkish minority to the Bulgarian political system has been 
47 Reuters, 5 November 1992. 
48 Ivaylo Grouev, 'The Bulgarian Model, Recent Developments in the Ethnic Landscape: An 
Interview with Mr. Ahmed Dogan, Chairman of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms', European 
Security, Vol. 6, No. 2, Summer 1997, p. 85 and Omer Turan, 'Bulgaristan Tiirklerinin Bugtinkll 
Durumu', Yeni Tiirkiye, 1995/3, p. 299. 
49 Nitzova, op. cit., p. 734. 
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the political party, called the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) that has 
officially been registered as a political party in January 1990. As an underground 
organization it has been functioning since 1985, including its leader Ahmet Dogan 
and other leading representatives. 50 In 1986 Dogan was sentenced to 10-year-
imprisonment and some of his aides were sent to jail as well. It has been stated that 
before its official registration the party was known as National Turkish Liberation 
Movement. It has also been argued that it helped organize anti-government protests 
in 1989. In fact, these protests became one of the most important factors that brought 
Zhivkov regime to an end. 51 In 1991 it was said to have registered member of 
120, 000. This means that within a time of little more than one year it has achieved to 
become fourth largest political organization in Bulgaria. 52 Then it became even the 
third largest political party. 
According to the new Bulgarian constitution and election law, no political 
party can be formed along ethnic and religious lines. Therefore, MRF avoids giving 
the impression that it represents the Turks, although most of its members are of 
Turkish origin. 53 MRF argued that the rights of different ethnic groups would be 
better guaranteed, if they were given the official status of minorities and their 
collective rights were recognized. 54 
Having gained around 5-7 % of the votes in the elections, it has played the 
key role in the Parliament. The party proved its effectiveness both in the formation 
and dissolution of governments. In 1992, when it withdrew its support, the 
government fell. The next technochratic government of Prof. Lyuben Berov could 
50 Nitzova, op. cit., p. 733. 
51 Kjell Engelbrekt, 'The Movement for Rights and Freedoms', Report on Eastern Europe, May 31, 
1991, Vol. 2, No. 22, p. 6. 
52 Ibid. 
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again be formed with the support of the MRF. 55 The then leader of the main 
opposition party UDF, Ivan Kostov, stated before the upcommg early general 
elections of April 1997 that MRF was considerably important in the Parliament, 
especially as regards to issues like constitutional change. 56 The primary aim of MRF 
has been stated as follows: "to contribute to the unity of the Bulgarian people and to 
the full and unequivocal compliance with the rights and freedoms of mankind and of 
all ethnic, religious, and cultural communities in Bulgaria."57 
Peaceful accommodation of Turkish minority within the political system was 
awarded by the international community. For example, it has contributed to a 
considerable extent to Bulgaria's membership of the Council of Europe in 1992. 58 
Not to intimidate Bulgarian political elite and public, the MRF clearly distances itself 
from terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, nationalism, and demand for autonomy. 
Many Bulgarians have been concerned especially about the last matter that, they 
consider would be the first step towards union with Turkey59 and towards 
'Cyprusization' ofBulgaria.60 
Besides its success in the general elections, MRF has repeated its 
effectiveness in regional and local elections as well. In 1991 it managed to elect 653 
village headmen, 27 municipal mayors, and 1, 144 representatives to municipal 
53 Turks make up 90 % of its members, Bulgars only 4-5o/o, the rest consists of other groups like 
Pomaks, Gypsies and Tatars, in Erninov, Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria, op. cit., p. 
174 and Engelbrekt, 'The Movement for Rights and Freedoms', op. cit., p. 7. 
54 Nitzova, op. cit., p. 733. 
55 Reuters, 30 December 1992 and Nitzova, op. cit., p. 734. 
56 Interview with the author, Yeni Yuzy1/, 19 April 1997. 
57 Engelbrekt, 'The Movement for Rights and Freedoms', op. cit., pp. 6-7. 
58 Nitzova, op. cit., p. 733. 
59 Engelbrekt, 'The Movement for Rights and Freedoms', op. cit., p. 7. 
60 Duncan M. Perry, 'Ethnic Turks Face Bulgarian Nationalism', Report on Eastern Europe, March 
15, 1991, Vol. 2, No. 11, p. 6 and Hans Joachim Hartel and Roland SchOnfeld, Bulgarien, Verlag 
Friedrich Pustet, Regensburg, SUdosteuropa Gesellschaft, Miinchen, 1998, pp. 280-281. 
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councils. In addition, it got 194 municipal mayorships in 1995 regional and local 
elections. 61 
Bulgarian nationalists who could not prevent official registration of the MRF 
did try to ban the party in 1991. They applied to the Bulgarian Constitutional Court, 
arguing that its existence was against the Constitution and" ... MRF (was) founded 
along ethnic and religious lines; the Movement used the Turkish language, and the 
MRF favor( ed) a policy of ethnic assimilation of Bulgarian Moslems to the Turkish 
minority and thus promot( ed) ethnic and religious confrontation within the 
population." However, the Court, by a narrowest margin, rejected the claims in April 
1992 and did not obstruct the functioning of the party. 62 
Bulgarian way of solving ethnic problems and role of the MRF in this system 
has been known as the Bulgarian model and shown as an example of solving ethnic 
conflicts. 63 It is on this background of Bulgaria's new constructive policy towards 
Turkish minority that allowed close cooperation between the two countries. It has 
also improved domestic political, economic, and social situation as well. Moreover, it 
has contributed to improving its relations with the outside world, mainly Western 
countries and organizations. 
Turkey has most of the time acted cautiously not to interfere in domestic 
affairs of Bulgaria. Only in cases where MRF was threatened with barring from 
participation in the elections, Turkey has stated its worries about it publicly. In 
September 1991, one month before the general and local elections, MRF has faced 
the danger of being prevented from taking part in the elections. The then Turkish 
Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz sent an informal letter to his Bulgarian counterpart 
Dimitar Popov. The letter, part of that dealing with the case of the MRF, was 
61 Eminov, Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria, op. cit., pp. 169-172. 
62Ibid., pp. 169-170. 
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published in the Trud daily. In his letter Yilmaz stated that he was seriously 
concerned about the "elimination of the MRF", which he said, played "a positive 
role" in Bulgarian politics. He argued that hindering the Movement from 
participating in the October elections was likely to signify "a dangerous step 
backward in the process toward democratization". Furthermore, he cautioned that not 
allowing the MRF to participate in the elections would undermine Bulgaria's 
position in the eyes of the international community and would have negative effects 
on what he described as the "constructive role" of the Turkish minority in domestic 
politics, as well as on Turkish-Bulgarian relations. 64 
Turkey expressed its good intentions towards Bulgaria and guaranteed that it 
would not try to use the Turkish minoriy in Bulgaria as a leverage against Bulgarian 
government. Turkish President Demirel stated that "Turks in Bulgaria are Bulgarian 
citizens and law-abiding citizens of their country. . . We do not instigate them at all to 
one thing or another. .. Turkey has no evil designs on Bulgaria."65 All this has helped 
improve relations between Ankara and Sofia. 
But this does not mean that there has never occurred any misunderstanding. 
For instance, the Turkish Interior Minister, Meral Ak~ener, noted during the 
Bulgarian election campaign in February 1997 that Turkish population in Bulgaria 
must be preserved, and that the members of Turkish minority of Bulgaria living in 
Turkey should go and vote in elections, this being very important for party 
representing Turkish minority in Bulgaria. 66 She also said: "Our brothers who will 
put forward their candidacy in the elections need a Turkish population in order to be 
63 Grouev, op. cit., pp. 86 and 89. 
64 Kjell Engelbrekt, 'Movement for Rights and Freedoms to Compete in Elections', Report on Eastern 
Europe, October 4, 1991, Vol. 2, No. 40, pp. 1-4. 
65 Reuters, 14 December 1993. 
66 Reuters, 25 March 1997. 
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elected. "67 This seems to have created some uneasiness at the back of the minds of 
the Bulgarian elite. But it did not stain the relations. It may be asserted that in order 
not to disturb friendly relations with Bulgaria, Turkey should rather refrain from 
trying to affect political opinions of Turkish minority in Bulgaria, and encouraging 
them to vote for a certain party. 
4.5. Turkish-Bulgarian Relations Within the Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
(BSEC) Zone 
At the beginning of the 1990s Turkey tried to adopt itself to the new 
international environment. One of its aims has been to be more active in the Black 
Sea region that came to host many more countries than in the Cold War era. Its 
attempt to achieve cooperation in the Black Sea region had two fundamental aims: a) 
"to become a member of European society of nations through economic development 
and Westernization, b) to try to create stability in the region by improving bilateral 
relations with neighboring countries, forming regional organizations and maintaining 
meanwhile the status quo ante."68 With the emergence of newly independent 
countries and the collapse of the power blocs in the region, new opportunities 
emerged for cooperation. In this new system, states could now act independently of 
superpowers and could cooperate that would in turn diminish the risk of religious and 
ethnic nationalism. Turkey's old ties with the Black sea region enabled Ankara to 
enhance its bilateral relations and to lead to multilateral cooperation. 69 
Turkey has not considered the Black Sea Economic Cooperation as an 
alternative to the EU, but as a facilitating step toward it. The then counselor of the 
67 Reuters, 25 February 1997. 
68 Oral Sander, Turkey and the Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation, in Turkish Foreign 
Policy, edited by Kemal Karpat, Madison, Wisconsin, 1996, p. 61. 
69 Ibid., pp. 61-63. 
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Turkish Foreign Ministry explained the Turkish position on the issue as follows: 
"[BSEC] is not an alternative policy. These are all complementary policies. The aim 
of Turkey and especially of its economic policy since the 1980s is to integrate the 
Turkish economy with that of the world. Turkey plays the role of stabilizer and 
moderator in the region. It would perform this role better from within the [EU] than 
from outside it."70 Most of countries of the region have big economic problems and 
are not technologically advanced. But they together constitute a market of 200 
million people. Moreover, there are some economic complementaries between them. 
For example, Russia has natural gas that it would export in return for Turkey's 
industry of consumer goods. Turkey can sell consumer goods to other countries in 
the region. When the market size of 200 million people taken into consideration, it 
would be hoped that the necessary capital would come from outside. 
The most important aims of BSEC can be summarized as follows: a) 
revitalizing Black Sea region economically, b) transfering Turkish experience in 
market economy to other countries of Caucasus, Balkan, and, Central Asian regions, 
c) increasing political cooperation and understanding, d) through the regioanl 
cooperation, making it easier for the member countries to participate in European 
structures. 
The meetings held at the beginning of 1990 resulted in the summit 
declaration signed by heads of state of Turkey, Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, 
Ukraine, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece, and Republic of Moldova, in 
istanbul on 25 June 1992. 71 It has been described as "an expression of the common 
70 Quoted from Ozdem Sanberk's article in Cumhuriyet daily, in Sander, Turkey and the Organization 
for Black Sea Economic Cooperation, op. cit., p. 64. 
71 Sander, Turkey and the Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation, op. cit., pp. 61-70. 
will and determination of the Black Sea countries to embark on a new multilateral 
cooperation based on the principles of a market economy. "72 
Bulgarian President Zhelev attended the signature of the declaration, 
emphasizing the importance Bulgaria atttaches to the agreement. However, 
Bulgaria's initial response to BSEC was not very favorable. Although it wanted to 
cooperate on ecological and other issues, it hesitated to cooperate on the political 
level, thinking that it would harm its relations with the European Community (EC) 
and put its membership prospect at risk.73 But, when the EC clearly expressed that it 
would not admit Bulgaria to full membership in the near future, Bulgaria began to 
look more favorably upon BSEC.74 Then, it has viewed BSEC as a useful instrument 
for its membership into European organizations. 75 
Bulgaria participated actively in BSEC facilities, but did hesitate to work in 
its parliamentary institutions. During armed conflicts in Mountainous Karabag, 
Chechnya, Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, Turkey tried to improve political 
cooperation among member countries, but Bulgaria rejected it. Thinking that the 
politicization of BSEC would harm its way to the EC, it has vetoed the formation of 
Black Sea Parliament. Moreover, Sofia has been against the enlargement of the 
BSEC, arguing that it must only keep current members. It was worried about the 
participation of Central Asian countries to the Organization. 76 
72 Oktay Oziiye, 'Black Sea Economic Cooperation', Mediterranean Quarterly, No. 3, Summer 1992, 
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4.6. Economic Relations 
Bulgarian attempts to form a free market economy have established the 
ground for improvement of Turkish-Bulgarian economic relations. Turkish 
experience of the establishment of free market and trade liberalization in the 1980s 
set an example for Bulgaria. On the other hand, Turkey's dynamic private sector has 
been interested in the privatisation bids in Bulgaria. The circumstances that would 
help increase economic relations between Turkey and Bulgaria can be summarized as 
follows: 
a) they are directly neighbors, so there are direct and cheaper transport facilities, 
b) economic reforms in Turkey that were carried out according to the Economic 
Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Programme of the 24 January 1980, 
c) favorable international and regional conditions, 
d) the possibility of joint access to third countries' markets.77 
As a result of the Bulgarian assimilation campaign, trade relations between 
the two countries had decreased to a considerable extent by the late 1980s. For 
Bulgaria, it was a critical point, because in 1984 it had gained a substantial surplus in 
bilateral trade with Turkish exports estimated at about 220 million leva, while 
imports less than 35 million. However, in 1989 the situation has become the 
opposite. Bulgaria was exporting products worth of 4 million dollars, but importing 
goods valued at 27 million dollars. 
77 Savash Orhan Jozioldash, op. cit., pp. 277-278. 
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The former Turkish Minister of State for Economic Affairs, I~m <;elebi, 
visited Bulgaria together with some Turkish businessmen in October 1990. He 
declared Turkey's readiness for economic cooperation with Bulgaria: Turkey could 
contribute to the development of Bulgarian economy by sharing its experience of 
market economy within an agrarian society. Soon after the visit Ankara offered 
Bulgaria a loan of 100 million dollars; half of that was to be used to purchase basic 
consumer goods, other half for investments. Then, Turkey agreed to give Bulgaria 
50,000 tons of crude oil to help reduce its fuel and energy crisis.78 Moreover, 
Turkey has helped Bulgaria through Turk Eximbank credits. In 1991 Turk Eximbank 
and Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank have signed an agreement; according to that, 
Turkey has given 50 million dollar trade credit to Bulgaria. In November 1992, it 
decided to give 50 million dollars more. Bulgarian Turkish Council of the Business 
People was established by Bulgarian and Turkish businessmen in 1991. 79 
There is also cooperation among Turkish and Bulgarian companies. For 
example Bulgarian state company Chimimport and Turkish foreign trade private 
company Penta established a joint venture in 1991. A year later, Bulgarian firm 
Deeja and Turkish company Starplastik formed a similar joint venture named 
Starplast. 80 As a result, Bulgarian-Turkish trade has increased from 60-70 million 
dollars in early 1980s to 329 million dollars in 1993. 81 
4.7. Bulgarian Policy Toward EU and NATO and Relations with Turkey 
As stated above, Bulgarian rapprochement with Turkey must be considered as 
part of its policy of integration to the Western structures. It has been aware of the fact 
78 Kjell Engelbrekt, 'Relations with Turkey: A Review of Post-Zhivkov Developments' Report on 
Eastern Europe, 26 April 1991. 
79 Jozioldash, op. cit., pp. 280-281 and Reuters, 3 November 1992. 
80 Jozioldash, op. cit., p. 279. 
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that to become a full member of European institutions, it had to solve its problems 
with neighbors, one of them being Turkey. Moreover, since Turkey has already been 
a member of NATO, it could help, even lobby for Bulgaria to be integrated into this 
Western security structure. As a result of improvement of bilateral relations, Turkey 
has given a cosiderable support to Bulgarian admission to NATO. 
Bulgarian former President Zhelev has been one of the most consistent 
NATO supporters among Balkan leaders. In 1994 Bulgaria signed Partnership for 
Pecae Programme with NATO. Zhelev stated that Bulgaria regarded this initiative 
merely as an intermediate goal on the way to full membership to NATO and Western 
European Union (WEU).82 Bulgarian government officially stated the country's 
desire to join NATO in 1997.83 However, NATO has accepted membership of only 
three countries in the first wave, namely Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic. 
Bulgaria has been inluded in the second wave. Therefore, Bulgaria's first foreign 
policy priority is still membership to NATO. Until Bulgaria reaches this aim, it will 
seek friendly relations with Turkey. 
Bulgaria has signed association agreement with the EC in March 1993. But it 
was not among 6 candidates that the EU has already started to negotiate for 
membership. In the short run it is not possible for Bulgaria to become a full member, 
mostly because it could not fulfill Copenhagen criteria, especially in the field of 
economy. The aim of Bulgaria to become EU member one day is an important factor 
81 Reuters, 22 January 1994. 
82 Dimitar Tzanev, Bulgaria's International Relations After 1989: Foreign Policy Between History and 
Reality, in Iliana Zloch-Christy, Bulgaria in a Time of Change: Economic and Political Dimensions, 
Aldershot, Hants, England; Brookfield, US, 1996, p. 183. 
83 For a detailed information on Bulgarian security policy alternatives and its possible consequences, 
see Valeri Ratchev, 'Searching for the Right Solution: Bulgarian Security Policy Was Confronted 
With a Difficult Choice', European Security, Summer 1997, Vol. 6, No. 2, p. 70. 
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determining its relations with Greece. 84 Bulgaria has been aware of the fact that EU 
membership would not come soon. The former president Zhelev admitted that it 
would take much longer than NATO membership, because of th fact that Bulgarian 
economy was not ready to compete with Europe.85 
4.8. The Political and Economic Crisis in Bulgaria 
Bulgaria experienced a severe economic crisis in late 1996 and early 1997. 
The annual inflation rate for 1996 reached 311 %. There was also shortage of grain. 
There were reports that some villages in Rhodope mountains did not get bread for a 
week. The crisis resulted from the delay of structural reforms, large foreign policy 
debt burden, and failure to draw considerable foreign investment. 86 
As a result of the economic crisis Zhan Videnov, Prime Minister, resigned 
both from leadership of Bulgarian Socialist Party and premiership. The economic 
situation in the country worsened in early 1997, with monthly inflation rate reaching 
to 43.8 % in January and even 242.7 % in February. Bulgarian population began 
daily demonstrations all over the country in January, calling for resignation of BSP 
government and also for early elections. In the end the government could not resist 
such huge reaction of the public and it resigned in February 1997. A caretaker 
government was formed with the leadership of popular Sofia mayor Stefa Sofijanski 
the same month. The new government signed a standby agreement with the IMF that 
84 For a considerable account of Bulgaria's relations with the EU, see Ilko Ezkenazi and Krasimir 
Nikolov, 'Relations With the European Union: Developments to Date and Prospects', in Zloch-
Christy, op. cit., pp. 189-204. 
85 FBIS, 'Zhelev on Caspian Pipeline, Ties to Turkey', 17 February 1995. 
86 For information on Bulgarian economic crisis in 1996 and 1997, see Michael Wyzan, 'Renewed 
Economic Crisis May End Foot Dragging on Reforms', Transition, 23 August 1996, Vol. 2, No. 17, 
pp. 40-43, Ognian Hishow, 'Transformationskrise und Krisenbewaltigung in Bulgarien', 
Siidosteuropa, 1997, Heft 7-8, p. 388, Stefan Krause, 'Bulgaria Survives a Dire Year', Transition, 7 
February 1997, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 49-51 and Stefan Krause, 'Problems Remain Unsolved As 
Government Stumbles Onward', Transition, 23 August 1996, Vol. 2, No. 17, pp. 36-39. 
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brought the introduction of a cur'"ency board and radical economic measures, thus 
easing the economic crisis in the country. 87 
In November 1996 there were presidential elections in Bulgaria in which 
Western-oriented Petar Stoyanov became the president beginning from January 
1997. In addition, general elections took place in April 1997 that brought pro-
Western UDF to power again with a great margin. This has been the beginning of a 
new period in Turkish-Bulgarian relations. 
87 Bulgaria Business Guide 98, Legal, Tax and Accounting Aspects. 
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CHAPTERV 
KOSTOV GOVERNMENT IN BULGARIA AND TURKISH-BULGARIAN 
RELATIONS 
5.1. The Impact of Pro-Western Administration in Bulgaria on Bilateral 
Relations 
Although the Turco-Bulgarian raprochement began and continued mostly 
during the goverments of the Bulgarian Socialist Party, the coming to power of the 
United Democratic Force's, compounded with the victory of Petar Stoyanov from the 
same party in the presidential elections, led to further improvement in bilateral 
relations. Turkey has considered it as a more appropriate counterpart whose belief in 
the European system of values is unquestionable. Therefore, it is in this period that 
both countries have been very pleased with the new state of affairs. For instance, 
Turkish Foreign Minister, Cem, has stated on various occasions that Turkey's 
relations with Bulgaria have been at its best. 1 Similarly, Bulgarian Foreign Minister, 
Nadezhda Mihailova, has declared that Bulgaria currently enjoys excellent ties with 
Turkey, and that her country has experienced irreversible break with the past.2 
Moreover, Turkey's President expresses his belief very often that "Bulgarian-Turkish 
relations are at their height now" thanks to the policy pursued by Stoyanov and 
Kostov who have contributed very much to the improvement of friendly relations 
between the two countries. 3 There have been official visits at the level of prime 
ministry and presidency by both countries on a regular basis. 
1 Reuters, 16 May 1998 
2 Nadezhda Mihailova, 'Security in Southeastern Europe and Bulgaria's Policy of NATO Integration', 
NATO Review, Spring 1998, No. 1, p. 6 and 9. 
3 Reuters, 6 November 1998. 
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Since the formation of technocratic government in the country in 1997, 
Bulgaria has been doing everything to promote its relationship with the Western 
world. It tries to solve all its long-standing problems with its neighbours, like border 
problem with Turkey and language problem with Macedonia. Acknowledging the 
fact that respect for minorities is a must to be united within European structures, it 
has ratified the Framework Agreement of the Council of Europe for the Protection 
of National Minorities. 
The resolution of language dispute with Macedonia was a great asset in this 
regard. As touched upon earlier, Bulgaria was the first country to recognize the 
independence of Macedonia; but it refused to accept the existence of Macedonian 
nation and language for a long time. That was why more than 20 agreements 
prepared in 7 years could not be signed between Bulgaria and Macedonia. In 
February 1999 Bulgaria and Macedonia solved this problem by signing an agreement 
in "Bulgarian in accordance with the Constitution of Bulgaria and Macedonian, in 
accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia." In that document, 
both parties declared that they do not have any territorial claims against each other. 
The document has signalled a compromise by Bulgaria, that is, de facto recognition 
of Macedonian language. This development has been welcomed by the international 
. 4 
commumty. 
Although Bulgaria in general has good relationship with the EU, Kostov' s 
criticism of it early 1999 has brought some problems to the surface. In his speech, 
Kostov criticized EU, saying that it has "done nothing for Bulgaria or has done 
negligibly little". He stated that unless the EU starts negotiations for membership 
4 For detailed infonnation on the agreement between Bulgaria and Macedonia, and international 
responses to it, see, Ron Synovitz, 'Bulgaria, Macedonia Resolve Language Dispute', RFF.IRL 
Newsline, End Note, 15 February 1999, Vol. 3, No. 31, Part 2; William Pfaff, 'Good News From the 
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with Bulgaria by 2001, his government may have to postpone the issue indefinitely, 
"since society can not get enthusiastic about goals 15-20 years away. 5 
Kostov pointed out that the EU was exercising a "meaningless diktat" by 
demanding closure of some reactors of Kozluduy nuclear plant as precondition to 
Bulgarian membership in the EU. He emphasized that a shutdown would destroy 
what little competitiveness Bulgaria still has after suffering severe financial crisis 
early 1997. In response, the EU officials insist that they had got promises from 
Bulgaria for early closure of some oldest reactors at Kozluduy nuclear plant. 
However, Bulgaria does not want to close them for the time being, because it 
produces considerable amount of electricity from the plant. Moreover, Kostov 
criticized the EU for appling different standards for countries that have not been 
named in the first wave of eastward enlargement. His criticism has been considered 
as similar to that of Turkey after it had not been accepted as candidate in the 
enlargement process. 6 If Bulgarian attitude remains ambiguous toward the EU and if 
Bulgaria continues to feel disappointed, this might cause closer relationship with the 
US. According to some Bulgarian newspapers, countries of the region, like Turkey, 
Bulgaria, Albania, and Macedonia that are not expected to become EU members in 
the short term will constitute a US bloc in the Balkans. And, Kostov' s speech has 
been regarded as a sign of this development. 7 
As stated earlier, Turkish minority in Bulgaria is a very important factor, 
moulding bilateral relations. Turkey follows very closely Bulgarian policy toward it 
and Sofia, too, pays attention to what kind of policy Turkey pursues concerning its 
Balkans', International Herald Tribune, 9 March 1999; Matthias Rub, 'In den offiziellen Sprachen 
beider Staaten', Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18 February 1999. 
5 RFE/RL Newsline, 2 March 1999, Vol. 3, No. 42, Part 2. 
6 Ron Synovitz, 'Kostov's Criticism of EU Highlights Threats to Reform', RFEIRL Newsline, 8 March 
1999, Vol. 3, No. 46, Part. 2. 
7 Center for Strategic Research, Turkish Foreign Ministry, Open Telegraph. 
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brethrens in Bulgaria. Bulgarian public which still seems to have Cyprus syndrome 
looks suspiciously at Turkey's policy toward the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. That 
is why Turkey should act carefully as regards to this sensitive issue. The MRF, 
despite the fact that most of its members are of Turkic origin, tries not to be seen as a 
Turkish party, since to form a party on ethnic lines has been forbidden by the 
Bulgarian constitution. 
Stoyanov's visit to Turkey in July 1997 was the evidence of closer 
relationship between the two countries. To show the sincerity of Bulgaria, Bulgarian 
President apologized for the assimilation camping of 1980. 8 Then the two countries 
moved on to Military Cooperation Agreement, covering defense, security policies as 
well as technological and scientific training. 9 During his visit to Ankara, Stoyanov 
wanted to destroy all possible remaining doubts of Turkey about Bulgaria. He really 
wanted to launch a close partnership era. He aimed at solving all remaining problems 
of the past era. There is every indication that, in this period, Bulgaria wishes to have 
closer cooperation with the Muslim Middle Eastern countries as seen in Stoyanov' s 
visit to Kuwait in June 199710, but during the exodus campaign, because of the 
Turkish pressure, Bulgaria was placed on the Organisation of Islamic Countries' 
(OIC) list of states that do not treat Muslims in a proper and respectful way. This 
had affected Bulgarian relations with these countries. It is not, therefore, surprising 
that Stoyanov asked Turkey to use its influence to push for Bulgaria's removal from 
the list of countries that did not treat Muslims in a good manner. 11 And Ankara 
complied with the request. In December of the same year, Turkey approached OIC, 
8 Ay~e Karabat, 'Bulgarian President's Historical Apology', Turkish Probe, 1 August 1997 via 
Reuters. 
9 Reuters. 30 July 1997. 
10 Ron Synovitz, 'Stoyanov Seek Better Relations With Muslim,Arab States', RFEIRL, 19 June 1997 
11 'Ties Wit Turkey Get Boost', New Europe, 3-9 August 1997, Issue No. 219 and Reuters, 1 August 
1997. 
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asking it formally to disregard its criticism of Bulgarian assimilation campaign in the 
1980s. 12 
In this period, it was not only Bulgaria that asked for Turkey's support for 
full membership to NATO, but Romania as well. There have been trilateral meetings. 
In return for its support to Romania-Bulgaria for closer relations with NATO, 
Turkey's security concerns were diminishing in the Balkans. One such trilateral 
meeting was held in Varna on 30 October 1997. Petar Stoyanov, Romania's Emil 
Constantinescu, Turkey's Demirel stressed that Bulgaria's and Romania's admission 
to NATO would greatly enhance the Alliance's, role in Southeastern Europe. 
Presidents of Bulgaria and Romania expressed their deep satisfaction with Turkey's 
support. 13 This has been called by some analysts a "new Balkan power triangle" 14 
In December 1997 Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Y1lmaz paid an official 
visit to Bulgaria . It was the first such visit by a Turkish prime minister in 18 years. 15 
A dispute lasting for 50 years about the border in the delta of the Rezovska River, 
which flows into the Black Sea, was resolved. According to the agreement, the 
borderline now passes right in the middle of the river mouth. During this visit, it was 
reported that the two countries should form a working group that will deal with 
problems of separated families and work to eliminate visa problems. 16 
It is noteworthy that many analysts regarded Ytlmaz's visit as "the beginning 
of the spring", while Y tlmaz himself said that "bilateral relations in all the areas and 
at all levels have reached a very successful stage." Yilmaz offered Turkey's services 
as Bulgaria's intermediary in commercial contacts with Central Asian and Caucasus 
12 Reuters, 2 December 1997. 
13 Reuters, 8 October 1997 
14 Reuters, 6 December 1997 
15 Petko Bocharov, 'Turkey Opens New Chapter In Relations with Neigbor'', RFF/RL, 9 December 
1997, www.rferl.org/nca/features/1997/12/F.RU.971210145649.html and Ergun Balc1, 'DI$ Politikada 
Onemli Bir Atihm', Cumhuriyet, 8 December 1997. 
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countries. In response, Kostov expressed his hope that Turkey would become 
"Bulgaria's gate into the Islamic and Arab world." 17 According to Yilmaz, there 
were no existing problems between Turkey and Bulgaria: "Especially the point 
where our bileteral relations reached in the last eight months is an example to other 
neighboring counties "18 It was in this period that Bulgaria signed the Framework 
Agreement of the Council of Europe for Protection of National Minorities. That 
assured Turkey of Bulgaria's goodwill to continue to respect the rights of its Turkish 
minority. Kostov's visit to Turkey in November 1998 was good news for Bulgarian 
Turks who had emigrated to Turkey. The two parties signed an agreement, according 
to which the emigrants would receive their pensions in Turkey. 19 
5.2. Pending Problems Regarding Turkish Minority 
Although Bulgaria has regranted most of rights of her Turkish minority, there 
still exist some problems. According to the Bulgaria Country Report on Human 
Rights Practices, released by the US Department of State on February 26, 1999, until 
today Bulgaria's plans for the establishment of national TV station to broadcast in 
Turkish has not been implemented. There is only limited radio broadcasting in 
Turkish on national radio's local affiliates in regions where there is a sizable Turkish 
speaking population. 20 The same criticism has been expressed by the leader of the 
MRF, Ahmed Dogan. According to the latter, there are radio broadcasts in Turkish 
only one hour per day, while in Zhivkov' s time it was four hours. He also says that 
there are American, French, Greek high schools, but no Turkish school. Moreover, 
16 Reuters, 6 December 1997. 
17 Reuters, 5-6 December 1997. 
18 Reuters, 7 March 1998 
19 Reuters, 6 November 1998. 
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he argues that instead of present optional extracurriculum courses, Turkish classes 
must be compulsory for the Turkish minority. 
Dogan also states that the underdevelopment of Turkish populated regions 
have been the result of deliberate government policies of not investing in these 
regions. He says: "during Zhivkov' s time the oppression was overt. Now, it is 
covert. "21 
5.3. Kosovo Crisis 
Problems in Kosovo has begun with the lifting of autonomous status of that 
region by Milosevic in 1989. At that time, Kosovo Albanians which constituted 90 % 
of the population of the province protested. But, the fact that Kosovo issue has not 
been addressed in the Dayton Peace Agreement, made it a potential flashpoint in the 
Balkans. The flashpoint finally exploded with resumption of Serbian aggression 
toward Albanians in Kosovo in late February 1998. The negotiations at Ramboillet in 
France among the parties to the dispute under international auspices have not 
produced any result, giving way to NATO's air intervention in late March 1999. 
Both Turkey and Bulgaria have common concerns in determining policy 
regarding the turmoil in Kosovo. Both countries have been uncomfortable with the 
fact that security in the Balkans has been threatened with the Serbian aggression. In 
addition, Bulgaria was aware of the fact that Kosovo problem has deferred potential 
investors in Bulgaria that needs foreign investment very much for economic 
20 Bulgaria Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998, US Department of State, 26 
February 1999, US Department of State Web Page: 
www.state.gov/www/globaVhurnan_rights/1998_hrp_report/. 
21 Interview of Turkish Daily News correspondent with the leader of the Movement for Rights and 
Freedoms, Ahmed Dogan, Turkish Daily News, 16 November 1998. 
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recovery. The embargo against Yugoslavia was hurting economic situation in the 
country, too.22 
Apart from that, the case of minority problem leading to civil war in the 
Former Republic of Yugoslavia has pleased neither Turkey nor Bulgaria which have 
minorities at home too. Therefore, both of them are totally in favor of keeping 
territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, otherwise, it would affect domestic situation in 
respective countries. Moreover, Kosovo crisis was an opportunity for both countries 
to show their solidarity with the Western world. Turkey, as member of NATO, has 
allowed two military bases in the country to be used by NATO planes to attack 
Serbian targets. In addition, it was a good chance for Bulgaria to speed up its 
membership process in Western institutions, especially NATO and the EU by 
supporting NATO intervention in Kosovo. It wanted to be seen as a reliable partner 
by the Western world.23 Bulgarian President Stoyanov said that Sofia hoped for fast 
and early accession to NATO in return for its support of the Alliance. 24 Similarly, 
Bulgarian Prime Minister Kostov expressed his hope that the EU would begin 
negotiations with Bulgaria for membership next year. He also said that NATO would 
offer membership to Bulgaria in 2001.25 
Bulgaria has provided first its air corridor for NATO planes, then its territory 
for NATO peace-keeping troops. But, Sofia has made it clear that by granting NATO 
airplanes access to Bulgarian airspace, it would not consider itself to be at war with 
22 Summary of Statement of Prime Minister Ivan Kostov Before Parliament on Bulgaria's Position on 
Kosovo, 16 March 1999, Web Page of Bulgarian Government, 
www.bulgaria.govrn.bg/kosovo _ eng/parl-q-Kosovo.html. 
23 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17 March 1999. 
24 RFEIRL Newsline, 26 April 1999, Vol. 3, No. 80, Part 2. 
25 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 May 1999. Foreign Minister Mihailova stated that her country 
deserves NATO membership, because of its cooperation with the Alliance over Kosovo, in RFEIRL 
Newsline, 12 March 1999, Vol. 3, No. 50, Part 2. 
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Yugoslavia.26 During the Kosovo crisis, Turkey and Bulgaria, sometimes together 
with some other Balkan countries, initiated proposals for solution of the problem. In 
Antalya Summit of 1998, seven Balkan countries, namely Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, 
Romania, Macedonia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Albania, adopted a 
declaration that called for a peaceful solution to the conflict, based on broad 
autonomy within the internationally recognized borders ofYugoslavia.27 
Besides supporting efforts of Western world to put an end to the oppression 
of Albanians, Bulgaria proposed that Turkey, Greece, Romania and Bulgaria issue a 
joint declaration on the problem. 28 Upon this initiative of Bulgarian Foreign Minister, 
the representatives of these four countries and also of Macedonia met in Sofia and 
adopted a declaration on Kosovo in which they stated their will to join efforts of 
international community to prevent the conflict that would affect all peoples in 
Europe.29 They have been for the opening of dialogue between Serb authorities and 
Kosova Albanians. Both sides sould refrain from using force. They underlined that a 
solution must be found to the problem within existing boundaries.30 Turkish Foreign 
Minister Cem underlined that Turkey's and Bulgaria's positions on Kosovo issue 
have been very close,31 and that relations with Bulgaria are at their best ever level. 32 
Besides similarities, there were also some differences of opinion between 
Turkey and Bulgaria concerning the Kosovo issue. While Bulgaria was against 
economic sanctions against Yugoslavia33, Turkey was in favor of it. Bulgarian 
Foreign Minister Nadezhda Mihailova has claimed that economic embargo against 
26 Prime Minister, President, Speaker Unanimous: Bulgaria Supports NATO Because It Wants Lasting 
Peace in the Region, 19 April 1999, Web Page of the Bulgarian Government, 
www.bulgaria.govrn.bg/kosovo _ eng/Kosovo _ o/o20190499 .html. 
27 BBC Monitoring Service, 15 October 1998, in Reuters, 15 October 1998. 
28 Reuters, 21February1998. 
29 Reuters, 11March1998. 
30 Reuters, 11 March 1998. 
31 Reuters, 14 May 1988. 
32 Reuters, 16 May 1998. 
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Yugoslavia benefits only "ruling clique in Belgrad". She argued that previous 
embargo during the Bosnian War led to the criminilazition of the Balkans, worsened 
the image of the region and prevented businessmen from investing in the Balkan 
countries. Mihailova declared that Bulgaria has become hostage to the conflict in the 
Balkans. 34 
Sofia considered military intervention in Kosovo crisis as the worst possible 
option35 and preferred a solution that could be reached by negotiations. Bulgarian 
Prime Minister Kostov said that Bulgaria would back decisions of the international 
community on the use of adequate means aiming to end the violence in Kosovo, 
should all other possibilities for a political settlement be exhausted. 36 When attempts 
to find a peaceful solution to the conflict did not produce any result, the ruling class 
of Bulgaria accepted the military intervention. 37 Turkey also preferred a peaceful 
solution to the problem. 
One important difference between Turkey and Bulgaria regarding the 
problem in Kosovo was that Bulgaria has criticized positions of both Kosovo 
Albanians and Belgrade regime. It argued that both sides had extremist demands that 
could not be reconciled. Prime Minister Kostov stated that Bulgaria was against both 
the official policy of Belgrade, as well as those Kosovo Albanians whose extremism 
was making it difficult to find a solution at the negotiating table. 38 On the other hand, 
Turkey was against the independence demands of Albanians living in Kosovo, but 
refrained from criticizing them publicly. 
33 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, op. cit., 17 March 1999. 
34 Ibid. 
35 SWB, 4 March 1999, EE 3474, p. B 1. 
36 SWB, 14 October 1998, EE 3357, B 11. 
37 Bulgarian President Stoyanov stated that "Bulgaria has no other choice, but to back the international 
community" regarding NATO decision to strike, inRFEIRL Newsline, 24 March 1999, Vol. 3, No. 58, 
Part II. 
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The potential spillover impacts of the Kosovo problem led to the formation of 
a peacekeeping force among Balkan states under the guidance of the US last year. 
Defence ministers of Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Albania, Macedonia, and 
Romania have fomally established South-Eastern Europe Multi-National Force 
(SEEMNF) in Athens on 12 January 1999. It will comprise 4,000 soldiers and will 
function as aid relief and peacekeeping. 39 There was discussion on the first 
headquarter of the force that will rotate every four years. In this debate Turkey has 
supported Bulgarian city of Plovdiv over Turkish city of Edirne. This has been 
considered a compromise by Turkey in favor of Sofia. 40 As a result, Plovdiv has been 
chosen as the first headquarter of the military force. The multinational peace force 
will become operational on 3 1 August 1999. 
5.4. The Issue of the PKK 
Bulgaria considers the Southeastern problem in Turkey as an internal issue. It 
declares its support for Ankara in its struggle with terrorism and states that Bulgaria 
has confidential cooperation with Turkey regarding this issue. 41 Bulgaria refrains 
from calling Turkey for finding a political solution to the problem, unlike statements 
of some Western countries. It seems that Bulgaria understands how sensitive Turkey 
on this issue is and if it really wants close cooperation with Turkey in all fields, it 
must respest Turkey's position on this problem. 
But there are some Kurdish organizations functioning in Bulgaria. These 
organizations carry out pro-PKK activities that make Turkey suspicious. Apart from 
38 Summary of Statement of prime Minister Ivan Kostov Before Parliament on Bulgaria's Position on 
Kosovo, 16 March 1999, Web Page of Bulgarian Government, 
www.bulgaria.govm.bg/kosovo eng/parl-g-Kosovo.html, op. cit. 
39 Zoran Kusovac, 'Balkan States to Set Up Rapid Reaction Force', Jane's Defence Weekly, 20 
January 1999, Vol. 31, Issue No. 3. 
40 Reuters, 15 November 1998. 
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that, Bulgaria has not declared PKK. as a terrorist organization so far. It has already 
been known that some PKK. members use Bulgaria as a transit country to go to 
Western Europe. 
Turkey, for the first time, voiced its warning to Sofia about the settlement of 
PKK. members in Bulgaria in 1993. At that time the Turkish former Foreign Minister 
Hikmet <;etin was in Sofia for the meeting ofBSEC. He stated that the PKK. tried to 
infiltrate into Bulgaria because of harsh measures taken against it in Western 
European countries and he got a promise from the Bulgarian side that Bulgaria would 
struggle against terrorism. Since that time the issue of the PKK. has become part of 
the bilateral relations. 42 
Although Turkey appreciates Bulgaria's support for its fight against 
terrorism, it insists on the prohibition of pro-PKK activities on Bulgarian territory 
and also on Bulgaria's declaration of PKK. as a terrorist organization. In response, 
Bulgaria states that it does not declare the PKK. a terrorist organization, because the 
PKK. does not have any activities in Bulgaria. 43 Sofia also claims that since Kurdish 
organizations are not involved in terror or criminal activities, it can not close them 
down. 
Turkey, who has already been uncomfortable with Greek support for the 
PKK., 44 keeps warning Bulgaria against support or easing of facilities for PKK.-
related activists in the country. Turkish President Demirel has recently repeated 
Turkey's position by calling on Bulgaria to declare the PKK terrorist organization 
41 Interview with the Bulgarian Ambassador to Turkey, Dr. Stoyan Stalev, May 1999, Ankara. 
42 Nurcan Ozgiir, 1989 Sonras1 Tiirkiye-Bulgaristan ili~leri, in Turk Dl§ Politikasmm Analizi, edited 
by Faruk Somnezoglu, p. 375. 
43 Interview with the Bulgarian Ambassador to Turkey, Dr. Stoyan Stalev, May 1999, Ankara. 
44 For Greek policy toward PKK, see Massimo Calabresi, 'A Hellenic Haven', TIME, 30 March 1998, 
www.mfa.gov. tr/grupe/eh/terror/greecebk/annex7 .bun. 
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and ban its activities in the country.45 In similar fashion, the Movement for Rights 
and Freedoms criticizes Bulgarian policy towards Kurdish groups, as well. It argues 
that the government of Bulgaria is indifferent to the PKK and calls on the 
government to prevent the terror organization from acting in the country. 46 
Some of the Kurdish groups in Bulgarian territory are as follows: Kurdish 
Cultural Club, Patriotic Union of Kurdish Students, Association of Kurdish Fellow 
Countrymen, and Bulgarian Cultural and Information Center for Kurdistan. Bulgaria 
argues that these are just cultural organizations and neither any PKK structure nor 
activity have been found in the country so far. Different attitudes displayed by the 
two countries may create problems in bilateral relations in the future. Turkey is not 
pleased with pro-PKK demonstrations in Bulgaria, like the one that has been 
organized by PKK supporters with PKK flags and posters on 1 May 1999, Worker's 
Day. Apparently, last year (i.e. 1998) Bulgaria did not allow PKK militants to attend 
demonstration with posters and flags. 47 Therefore, the demontsrations of 1 May this 
year have created some tension in bilateral relations. 
In sum, Bulgaria respects Turkish sensitivity on the Kurdish issue and tries 
not to irritate Turkey. But its position is far from satisfying Turkey, mainly because it 
insists on not naming the PKK a terror organization. However, in case this issue has 
been internationalized, like the Ocalan crisis of late 1998 and early 1999, it prefers to 
employ the European argument. It states its willingness to follow the European 
policy. 
It has been clear that the position of the Bulgarian Socialist Party on the 
Kurdish problem is very different from the attitude of the Union of Democratic 
Forces. Some members of the Bulgarian Socialist Party do not even refrain from 
45 Milliyet, 23 March 1999. 
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supporting the PKK publicly. Some parliamentarians of the Bulgarian Socialist Party 
have become members of 'the National Committee for Defending Ocalan'. One of 
these parliamentarians, Velko Vulkanov, who has been elected from the Bulgarian 
Socialist Party list, but is now independent MP, has stated: "Ocalan is Levski [A hero 
in the Bulgarian history who contributed to the Bulgarian independence movement in 
the Ottoman Empire] of the Kurdish people. As long as I live and have power, I will 
continue to support Kurdish nation". 48 Some MPs from the Bulgarian Socialist Party 
asked Turkey to allow an international health committee to inspect Ocalan's health. 
Early 1999, 12 MPs from the Bulgarian Socialist Party have sent a letter to the 
European Parliament, emphasizing the need to find a "political solution" to what they 
regard as the Kurdish problem. In the letter they have presented the PKK as the 
"national liberation movement of Kurds". And they have claimed that Europe 
remains silent to the "genocide carried out against the Kurdish nation". 49 It seems 
that if the Bulgarian Socialist Party comes to power in the future, Turkey may face 
more problems regarding Bulgaria's attitude toward PKK. 
5.5. Developments in Economic Relations 
In July 1998, the two countries signed a free trade agreement that has entered 
into force as of Jan 1, 1999. 50 The agreement foresees decreasing customs duties for 
industrial goods gradually and reducing it to zero in 2002. It also foresees the 
establishment of free trade zones between the two countries. Thanks to this 
46 SWB, 14 January 1999, EE 3432, pp. B 1-2. 
47 Center for Strategic Research, Ankara, Open Telegraph. 
48 Center for Strategic Research, Ankara, Open Telegraph. 
49 Center for Strategic Research, Ankara, Open Telegraph. 
50 Reuters, 18 July 1998. 
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agreement, Turkish Ambassador to Bulgaria, Tahsin Burcuoglu, estimated that 
Bulgaria will become third important trade partner for Turkey. 51 
Turkey and Bulgaria have increased economic cooperation as well in recent 
years. They increased energy cooperation through signing of a five-year- agreement. 
That would boost cooperation in the energy field. Bulgaria exports 300-400 
megawath of electricity monthly to Turkey, getting mountly income of 10 million 
dollars from this export. 52 In 1998 another agreement was signed, according to which 
Turkey will purchase electricity from Bulgaria for 10 years; in return, Turkey's 
Ceylan Holding will build 114-km-long highway between Orizovo and Kaptan 
Andrevo and will construct three dams within the framework of Upper Arda 
Project. 53 
About 2,000 Turkish firms operate in Bulgaria. Turkey has been reported as 
the 10th largest investor in Bulgaria with $ 23 million last year. Some Turkish firms 
are interested in privatization projects of Bulgaria. Opening of branches of two 
Turkish banks, namely Ziraat Bank and Demirbank, in Sofia, would make economic 
transaction between two countries easier. 
According to the the Economist Intelligence Unit, Bulgarian exports to 
Turkey have increased from 283.8 million dollars in 1993 to 440.9 million dollars in 
1997, being the third biggest receiver of Bulgarian goods, after Italy and Germany. 
In the same period its percentage has increased from 7. 6 % to 9. 0%. On the other 
hand, Bulgarian imports from Turkey have reached from 76.8 million dollars in 1993 
to modest 101.3 million dollars in 1997, this time being the 9th biggest partner. 54 Its 
51 Pari Daily, 4 October 1998, in Reuters, 4 October 1998. 
52 Reuters, 5 March 1997 
53 BBC Monitoring Service, 8 October 1998, in Reuters, 8 October 1998 and Reuters, 2 April 1999. 
54 The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1998, p. 24. For deeper analysis of Bulgaria's trade relationship, 
see Rossitsa Chobanova, Economic and Political Developments in Bulgaria', in The Southeast 
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percentage has reached from 1.6 % to only 2.1 %. Although the volume of trade has 
almost doubled between 1992 and 1998 from$ 297 million to$ 581 million55, there 
is an imbalance in trade relations between Turkey and Bulgaria. 
Bulgaria is the 27th biggest trade partner of Turkey, regarding Turkish 
imports; and it is the 30th biggest partner concerning Turkish exports, after Romania 
13th and Greece 25th. As regards to foreign investments in Bulgaria, there are 1,626 
Turkish firms operating in Bulgaria that have invested $ 2.4 million in the country. 
On the other hand, Greek investment in the country has amounted to $ 60 million in 
1996. In terms of amount of investment Turkey has the 6th place and concerning 
number of firms Turkey ranks 10th. 56 When the geographical proximity and number 
Turkish origin people in Bulgaria have been taken into account, the amount of 
Turkish trade and investment seem negligible. 
Economic situation in southeastern Bulgaria, where Turks constitute majority 
of the population, is much worse than other parts57 Therefore, Turkey must 
encourage Turkish businessmen to invest there. This would discourage secret 
emigration of Turks in Bulgaria to Turkey because of economic difficulties and 
contribute to the development of these regions. It now seems that Turkish 
businessmen favor Romania among Balkan countries because of its bigger 
population, but Bulgaria must not be ignored. As of 1996 Greece has opened four 
banks in Bulgaria and invested of$ 60 million. However, In contrast, Turkey has 
opened only 2 banks in recent months. 
European Yearbook, 1997-1998, edited by Thanos M. Veremis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, Athens, 
1998, pp. 192-193. 
55 Republic of Turkey, Undersecretary of Foreign Trade, General Directorate of Agreements, Turkish-
Bulgarian trade figures. 
56 Ozgilr, 1989 Sonras1 Tiirkiye-Bulgaristan ili~kileri, op. cit., pp. 386-387. 
57 Intetview of Turkish Daily News correspondent with the leader of the Movement for Rights and 
Freedoms, Ahmed Dogan, Turkish Daily News, 16 November 1998. 
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In terms of investment, Turkey should not lag behind Greece. Moreover, 
improving trade relations will make two countries more interdependent on each 
other, and this may assure continuation of friendly relations between two countries in 
all fields in the future. 
Turkey and Bulgaria can also cooperate in the oil pipeline issue. After the 
official opening ofBaku-Supsa oil pipeline on 24 April 1999; Bulgaria, Georgia, and 
Ukraine have signed an agreement on joint operation of a feery link from Poti, 
Georgia via Ilichovsk in Ukraine to Varna in Bulgaria. Thanks to this new pipeline, 
Bulgaria got closer to the Caspian oil. If one of two oil pipeline projects ( a-
Bourgas-Alexandroupolis or Bourgas-Skopje-Vlore) is implemented, Caspian oil 
might run through Bulgaria in its way to world markets. In fact, this pipeline route is 
seen alternative to the Baku-Ceyhan one. Valentin Kanev, executive director of 
Balkan Black Sea Oil association, told Kapital weekly that project of Bourgas-
Alexandroupolis has still been on the agenda, but if Baku-Ceyhan route is preferred, 
it would lose its significance. 58 If Burgas-Alexandroupolis or Baku-Ceyhan route is 
preferred for the passage of Caspian oil, Turkey and Bulgaria can still perhaps 
cooperate on oil trade as well. 




Because of their membership to opposing power blocs during the Cold War, 
bilateral relations between Turkey and Bulgaria generally remained tense. Although 
they experienced some short normalization periods, these were always short-lived. 
The assimilation campaign of 1980s and the deportation of more than 3 50, 000 Turks 
by the Bulgarian government in 1989 worsened the Turkish-Bulgarian relations. 
However, changes in both international and domestic dynamics of late 1980s 
have allowed quick rapprochement between the two countries. As regards to world 
system, the fall of Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War restrictions on the one 
hand; and concerning domestic system, overthrow of Zhivkov in Bulgaria on the 
other, have changed the orientation of Bulgarian domestic and foreign policy from 
socialist to pro-European one, like most of other East and Central European 
countries. The post-Cold War domestic and foreign policy of Bulgaria, including its 
policy toward Turkey, must be analyzed within its Europeanization efforts. 
As soon as Todor Zhivkov was ousted from power by the reformist wing of 
the Bulgarian Communist Party, the new government under Mladenov sought ways 
to improve relations with Turkey. The first condition to be able to achieve it was to 
restore rights to Turkish minority and put an end to the assimilation policy. The new 
government of Bulgaria re-allowed Turks to use their Turkish names, to have access 
to education in their mother language and to practice their religion free from any 
restriction, notwithstanding opposition from Bulgarian public at the beginning. It has 
also allowed participation of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, composed 
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mostly of Turkish members, into the political system. Now, the Movement for Rights 
and Freedoms is the third biggest party in the country and holding a key role in the 
political system. 
At the beginning of the new era in Bulgarian politics, Turkey remained 
cautious. It could not fully trust Bulgaria whether what the Bulgarian communist 
regime called the regeneration process against Turkish minority would not be 
repeated. But, as time went by, Turkey could believe in the continuation of a new 
period in Bulgaria. Thanks to establishment of mutual trust, they began to cooperate 
in different fields, including security, in a year time following the crisis of 1989. It 
must be noted that the cooperation between the two countries was achieved during 
the tenure of Bulgarian Socialist Party, that is, the successor to the Bulgarian 
Communist Party. 
For Bulgaria, it has been vital to improve its relations with Turkey, because; 
first, it wants to be a member of European institutions, like NATO and EU, and 
Turkey's support is very important, especially concerning its relations with NATO; 
second, about 10 % of its population is of Turkish origin, therefore, it can not ignore 
relations with Turkey; third, it should solve all its problems with neighboring 
countries to become part of European structures; fourth, Turkey has second biggest 
and technologically developed army within NATO, so, to assure the security of its 
southern border, it must have friendly relations with its neighbor; fifth, Turkey, with 
a population more than 60 million people and a dynamic economy is an important 
market for Bulgarian goods on the one hand and enthusiastic businessmen of Turkey 
can also be a good source of foreign investment that Bulgaria is still in dire need of 
On the other hand, Bulgaria is an important ally for Turkey, first and 
foremost, because Ankara has uncomfortable relationship with most of its 
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neighbors. 1 In such a neighborhood, it makes sense for Turkey to improve its 
relations with Bulgaria. Moreover, Bulgaria is considered as an island of stability in 
the Balkans which has witnessed considerable number of bloody conflicts in the new 
era. Therefore, it provides a reliable ally for Turkey for cooperation in solving 
regional conflicts, like the Bosnian War and the Kosovo crisis. Turkey must also take 
the situation of Turkish minority living in Bulgaria into consideration and that is why 
it must closely follow Bulgaria's policy toward them. From the economic point of 
view, Bulgaria, especially because of its geographical proximity, is a significant 
market for Turkish products. In addition, privatization programme of the Bulgarian 
government provides an important opportunity for Turkish businessmen. 
The victory of Western-oriented United Democratic Forces both in the 
Bulgarian presidential and general elections, respectively in November 1996 and 
April 1997 has paved the way for even closer relationship with Turkey. Turkish side 
has found a more appropriate counterpart as a result of these elections. Turkish and 
Bulgarian high-level officials have met very often, concluding agreements from 
abolition of customs, facilitation of the pension payments of Turkish emigrants in 
Turkey to cooperation against organized crime and drug smuggling, as well as 
cooperation in military affairs. 2 But, any change in government in either country 
should not be expected to reverse the pattern of relationship between them. The fact 
that Turkish-Bulgarian rapprochement began during the government of the Bulgarian 
Socialist Party is an evidence of it. However, given, for example, its position on the 
PKK-related issues, bilateral contacts might face problems during the tenure of the 
Bulgarian Socialist Party. 
1 Turks and Bulgars Make Up, The Economist, 27 February 1999, p. 30. 
2 The Economist, dated 27 February 1999, notes that Kostov and Ytlmaz met eight times in less than a 
year; op. cit, p. 30. 
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The Turkish-Bulgarian relations in the post-Cold War era would constitute a 
model for other Balkan countries. The two countries managed to solve significant 
problems, including the one about a minority. They have contributed to educate the 
culture of cohabitation in the region. This has really been considered a great success 
in a region that is home to many minority problems. 
With the beginning of the crisis in Yugoslavia, it has become very popular to 
explain conflicts in the Balkans in terms of "ancient hatreds" mythology. According 
to it, history of the region has been full of ethnic conflicts. That is why it is not 
possible for people of different ethnic origin to live together; nor is it possible for 
states of the region to have friendly relations with each other.3 The establishment of 
friendly relations between Sofia and Ankara and the case of Turkish minority in 
Bulgaria has been a good example to show that Balkan countries can manage to 
solve their minority problems and cooperate with each other. 
As stated, the betterment of Turkish-Bulgarian relations have occurred, 
thanks to Bulgarian Europeanization efforts. The course of Bulgarian relationship to 
Turkey may change, if Sofia becomes a member of NATO. In this case, the first 
foreign policy priority of Bulgaria will change from membership to NATO, to that of 
full membership to the EU. This development may cause Bulgarian foreign policy to 
be closer to Greece, that is already an EU member, at the expense of Turkey. 
Bulgaria has so far expressed a few times that as regards to problems between 
Turkey and the EU, it will follow the line of EU, like the recent Ocalan crisis. In case 
of achieving NATO membership, it might adopt the approach of the EU countries 
that has not been always welcomed by Turkey. In sum, the future course of Turkish-
Bulgarian relations is dependent on their relationship to the European institutions. 
3 Robert Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History, Vintage Books, New York, 1994, p. 23 
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